NATO Foundation
Defense College

ENERGY STRATEGIES 2024

AFRICA, NATO AND ENERGY SECURITY OF SUPPLY

ENERGY STRATEGIES 2024

Africa, NATO and energy security of supply

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the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme,
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NATO Defense College Foundation

The NDCF is a unique think-tank: international by design and based in Rome, due to its association with the NATO Defense College. Its added value lies in the objectives stated by its charter and in its international network, which make the Foundation a body with considerable freedom of action, transnational reach and cultural openness. The charter specifies that the NDCF works with the Member States of the Atlantic Alliance, its partners and the countries that have some form of co-operation with NATO. Through the Foundation the involvement of USA and Canada is more fluid than in other settings. The Foundation was born in March 2011 and is rapidly expanding its highly specific and customer-tailored activities, achieving an increasingly higher profile, also through activities dedicated to decision makers and their staffs. Currently, the Foundation is active in three areas: high-level events, strategic trends research and specialised decision makers' training and education.

Energy Strategies 2024. Africa, NATO and energy security of supply.
Rome, 16 April 2024


AFRICA, NATO AND ENERGY SECURITY OF SUPPLY
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THE CHALLENGE OF MARKET INTEGRATION

Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo
President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

FOREWORD

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, buon pomeriggio a tutti, welcome to this conference. This conference is part of a series dedicated to energy in relation to security and strategic issues, involving a long list of connected problems of general interest. Today's focus is on a new vision of Africa in its relationship with Europe and the Atlantic Alliance on the strategic issue of energy security. The objective is a friendly discussion, in a spirit of respect, addressing the scenario of a «rising Africa». Since 2017, the Foundation has addressed the security situation, producing almost 40 high-level conferences and books wishing to shape security horizons on the international agenda. It is a pleasure to be twinned with the NATO Defense College.

Today, the focus is on Africa from the viewpoint of energy, exploring how to complement its resources with our market to find formulas to the advantage of everybody. The vast universe of the subject, this is obvious, cannot be summarised in simplistic formulas. The discussion faces interconnected realities like economic development, security, regional cooperation, and migrations. Has been suggested here that shared interests and a sustainable development will promote a lasting peace and a long-term cooperation. This direction seems the right one to go to, but it is not an easy task because there is also the challenge of climate change and the green transition of all things. Other elements are infrastructures, their security, regulations, and a structured connection between the South and the North of the world. It is important to keep in mind that today it is impossible to consider issues in a separate way, as it used to be the norm in a traditional past.

The purpose of the conference is to give a comprehensive view of the global scenario and propose guidelines for future developments. The discussion turns around three main issues: how to promote a new relationship between Europe and African producers, considering the continent's vast resources, including traditional ones like oil and gas, as well as the emerging renewables? How to harmonise different interests and types of resources considering the protection of the infrastructure?

The second panel addresses the security framework encompassing the African continent, Western Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance, which remains the most relevant security provider. Security arrangements and relations with the AU are at an initial stage, but the development of practical cooperation is envisioned, based on advice, technical assistance, institution building, and civilian-military relationships. The discussion will not focus on the hard aspects of military involvement but will emphasise market integration and its compatibility with security.

There are a few examples, but clearly, a lot of work remains to be done. Cooperative security should be promoted alongside economic issues to create a stable framework. A conclusion could be that the many actors involved should collectively develop a broad economic picture connected with security, fostering peace and prosperity where the African continent plays a major role and receives due recognition.

I wish to thank the speakers, the moderators, the public for your interest, the Staff of the Foundation for their excellent work and their enduring enthusiasm. Finally, the Science for Peace and Security programme of NATO that made this event possible, the Compagnia di San Paolo, the OCP of Morocco and of course our partner of reference, the College. A special thank goes to Formiche, our traditional media partner.

After having served at the Italian Embassy in Washington DC and as Commercial Counsellor at the Embassy of Italy in Prague, Ambassador **Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo** worked as Head of the External Relations Office of the EEC from 1981 to 1986. In the following years, his career focused on Europe and Space Policy. In 1997 he was appointed Diplomatic Counsellor of the Minister of Defence Beniamino Andreatta, then of his successors Carlo Scognamiglio and Sergio Mattarella. In 2000, Minuto-Rizzo held the position of Italian Ambassador to the Western European Union and to the Political and Security Committee of the EU, of which he was among the founding members. He was Deputy Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance between 2001 and 2007. His mandate was mostly carried out in the strategic-political industrial area and in the relations with sensitive countries such as those in the Gulf and the Southern Mediterranean. He is the author of the books: *The road to Kabul* (Il Mulino-Arel, 2009); *A political journey without maps. Diversity and future in the Greater Middle East* (Rubbettino, 2013); and *NATO and the Middle East: The Making of a Partnership* (New Academia Publishing, 2018).

MAX A.L.T. NIELSEN
Commandant, NATO Defense College, Rome

WELCOME REMARKS

The main educational activities of NATO Defense College do not specifically focus on energy security of the supply context. However, our research does focus on the main issues coming from the energy sector, promoting awareness about the functioning of NATO in the new geopolitical context of emerging technologies.

Many Western governments initially considered the energy crisis of 2022 in simplistic terms, in favour of a drastic shifts towards renewables. According to this perspective, such shift would have increased long-term security by reducing global climate change and by breaking Western countries' dependency on other countries.

Two years on, things are no longer so clear, and I will try in a couple of minutes to highlight three underlying questions for critical thinking today. The first relates to the perennial question of alliance cohesion. Being from the NDC, that is of course of paramount importance to me.

In this new global geopolitical environment, energy is a field where nations tend to point fingers at one another for not taking energy security seriously enough or for putting costly security criteria ahead of the need to keep the lights on. So how do we ensure solidarity between allies with very different energy mixes, different geographic supply relations, different technologies? The challenge is in fact not new. It was one of the first challenges really for NATO on the internal side, the Suez Crisis (1956).[1]

[1] Note of Editor, source: Britannica. Suez Crisis, (1956), international crisis in the Middle East, precipitated on 26 July 1956, when the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal. The canal had been owned by the Suez Canal Company, which was controlled by French and British interests. The Suez Crisis was provoked by an American and British decision not to finance Egypt's construction of the Aswan High Dam, as they had promised, in response to Egypt's growing ties with Communist Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Nasser reacted to the American and British decision by declaring martial law in the canal zone and seizing control of the Suez Canal Company, predicting that the tolls collected from ships passing through the canal

We often recall that the crisis bequeathed us with positive innovations like better intra-allied consultation, but it also gave us negative energy dependencies. Allies were so shocked by the state of intra-alliance coordination that they reached out to Moscow, seeking an alternative supplier of oil and gas hydrocarbons. The roots of our current cohesion challenges run deep.

The second underlying issue is related to the notion of *energy autonomy*. More specifically, this concept represents the idea according to which the switch to wind, hydro, and nuclear, would mean for Western countries to be independent from the rest of the world. During the energy crisis, many Western governments began to view dependencies as the main cause of instability, prone to weaponisation and coercive diplomacy. In other words, energy autonomy is therefore considered as the only antidote to dependency. At the NATO Defence College, we have large numbers of course members from the Alliance's partner countries. And the question is always, what can our partners teach us? One area is in dealing with dependencies, because it turns out that these are neither optional nor necessarily negative.

Even by investing in renewables, cooperation with other countries is still necessary: new technologies, rare-earths minerals, bright minds and, yes, even hydrocarbons play a vital role. And it is engagement with the outside world that offers a path to greater autonomy, diversifying our range or energy partnerships and offering potential partners a kind of mutual autonomy, where both sides reduce their dependencies on big, aggressive countries.

The third and final issue involves climate change. According to the 2023 Allied Command Transformation's Strategic Foresight Analysis (released in 2024),[2] climate breakdown and loss of biodiversity are the most significant and consequential challenges. These issues will prompt significant changes in attitudes and behaviours of both state and non-state actors. The global energy transition represents a global effort: we need the world's biggest economies and companies to quickly develop and adopt GreenTech.[3] The problem is that some of those big economies pose a clear

would pay for the dam's construction within five years. Britain and France feared that Nasser might close the canal and cut off shipments of petroleum flowing from the Persian Gulf to western Europe. When diplomatic efforts to settle the crisis failed, Britain and France secretly prepared military action to regain control of the canal and, if possible, to depose Nasser. They found a ready ally in Israel, whose hostility toward Egypt had been exacerbated by Nasser's blockage of the Straits of Tīrān (at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba) and the numerous raids by Egyptian-supported commandos into Israel during 1955–56. Operation Musketeer, failed politically and strategically, despite being operationally well executed. Nasser and the USSR forced the three countries to retreat from the Suez Canal.

[2] https://www.act.nato.int/article/act-releases-sfa-2023/.

[3] https://www.netguru.com/blog/what-is-greentech.

and present threat to our society, attacking critical infrastructures and exploiting energy as a geoeconomic lever. In the past, the Alliance tended to categorise Russia and China as partners when dealing with climate change and global development, but now it is clear that these powers are competitors when it comes to the big global challenges.

In the end, the question is: can global climate change be mitigated by coalitions of the willing? And who is on which side? It is fundamental to share the same perspective and views across these challenges. It is time to pave better solutions for our common future, for our safety and security.

Lieutenant General **Max A.L.T. Nielsen** joined the armed forces in 1983 and graduated from the Royal Danish Air Force Academy in 1988. In 1996, he completed the US Air Command and Staff College in Montgomery, Alabama, and then served as Chief of the Air Operations Branch at Tactical Air Command Denmark. In 2002, he became Chief of Operations Branch at Defence Command Denmark. In 2005, he was deployed to Baghdad as Military Assistant to the Deputy Commander of NATO Training Mission – Iraq. In 2011, he graduated from the NATO Defense College (NDC) and served as Deputy Danish Military Representative to NATO in Brussels. He then became Senior Military Assistant to the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and Head of the CMC's Office. Promoted to Major General in 2014, he held several senior positions before becoming Vice Chief of Defence in 2017 and Danish Military Representative to NATO and the EU in 2019. In July 2023, he became the 32nd Commandant of the NATO Defense College. His leadership emphasises hard work, engagement, listening, and clear communication. General Nielsen has received numerous honours, including Commander of the Order of Dannebrog.

Stefano La Tella

Counsellor, Office of the Diplomatic Advisor, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Rome

WELCOME REMARKS

Energy security is one of today's defining challenges. Global energy consumption is rising due to growing populations, energy-intensive technologies, and the legitimate aspirations of people worldwide to improve their well-being. At the same time, the urgent need to address climate change has made accelerating the energy transition more urgent, further reducing cost-effective but often carbon-intensive options. Addressing the issue is complex in the short to medium term as efforts are made to achieve sustainable economies of scale and resilient supply chains for renewable energy.

This is a direct concern for NATO countries, as evidenced by the impact of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. The urgent need to diversify energy supplies has caused energy prices to skyrocket, exacerbated by widespread speculation on gas prices and attempts by Moscow to weaponise dependencies. This vulnerability was tempered by strong capacity to react and by the resilience of economies and societies. Consumption was reduced, national production was boosted, and alternatives were found among friends and Allies. Nonetheless, the lesson learned cannot be ignored, and countries like Italy are working hard to ensure broad diversification of their energy supply flows.

In Italy's case, natural gas is a key transition fuel, and short-term efforts have focused on maximising the use of existing infrastructure from countries like Azerbaijan and Algeria. However, looking at the medium to long term, however, Italy's interests align with Africa's, specifically in the production of clean energy in partnership with African nations: from electricity generated by renewable sources to green hydrogen. Energy security is a priority for Africa and Italy, with the need to support growing populations and fuel their economies. However, only 3% of global investments in energy are directed towards Africa, which means approximately $ 90 billion/year for almost one and a half billion people, nearly 1/5 of the global population. Without abundant energy, African nations cannot hope to address the

multiple challenges they face, nor will they be able to provide their citizens with decent livelihoods and prospects, the priority of every government.

Energy poverty affects food security, employment, education, and health. This can drive regional conflicts, radicalisation, crime, and irregular migration, that harm countries of origin, transit and arrival. Given the context, African countries can hardly be blamed for seeking the most cost-effective options. Nonetheless, cheap alternatives such as coal pose evident threats to our common fight against climate change, whose security implications are highlighted by NATO's climate and security agenda.

Italy is addressing this challenge very seriously, placing energy cooperation as a key pillar of the Mattei Plan for Africa.[1] This Plan is aimed at building win-win partnerships, ensuring long-term sustainability. Initially, with nine countries across the continent, joint work programmes are being developed in six key areas: education, agriculture, health, infrastructure, water, and energy. Regarding energy, a key component of the Plan involves the extensive involvement of the private sector in projects related to renewable energy capacity, especially in North Africa. This includes developing interconnectors and pipelines that will allow green energy produced in Africa to flow to Italy and the rest of Europe. The large-scale development of this model requires overcoming various obstacles: some are local, such as legal frameworks, investment certification, and technology development; others pertain to Africa's need for better regional integration and infrastructural development across countries.

NATO, through dialogue and collaboration with the African Union, could play an important role in this regard, especially considering the conflicting interests by other global actors who seek more beneficial arrangements through strictly bilateral cooperation. One major obstacle for energy security in the context of the energy transition is the current scarcity of critical minerals and resources. Many of these are abundant throughout Africa. Therefore, it is in the interest of global stability, including NATO's security, to help transform Africa into a key player in the clean energy sector.

[1] https://www.mur.gov.it/it/piano-mattei-ricerca-e-alta-formazione; https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-opening-address-italia-africa-summit/24861.

Counsellor **Stefano La Tella** holds a master's degree in Law. He has 10 years of experience at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, where, as a diplomatic officer, he served in various offices, including the Press and Information Service (2010-11), the Directorate General for Political and Security Affairs (including Russia, Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia Unit in 2011), the Italian Embassy in Bogotá (2013-17), and the Italian Embassy in Berlin (2017-21). Counsellor La Tella is currently serving as a Counsellor in the Office of the Diplomatic Advisor to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

A woman cleaning a solar panel, which is her main source of income.
Southern Mauritania.

OPENING REMARKS

Nouzha Chekrouni

Senior Fellow, Policy Center for the New South, Rabat

OPENING REMARKS

The world is currently facing ongoing wars and the urgent need to transition to a more sustainable energy future. In this context, diversifying the energy portfolio between European importers and regional producers is a complex endeavour, especially given the ongoing conflicts and the EU Green Deal.[1] The newest exploitable resources are owned by at least a dozen countries across the African continent, with an additional six countries among those holding the largest reserves. Africa's energy landscape is diverse and vast, with significant potential for both fossil fuels and renewable energy sources. This diversity presents both opportunities and challenges that require attention.

In terms of fossil fuels, Africa holds approximately 124 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, placing it as the fifth largest continent in terms of oil reserves. Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, and Angola are among the top twenty oil-rich countries globally. Additionally, Africa boasts substantial natural gas reserves, amounting to approximately 17,56 trillion cubic metres, making it the third largest continent in terms of natural gas reserves. Algeria, Nigeria and Egypt also rank among the top twenty natural gas-rich countries globally.

Africa's renewable energy potential is equally noteworthy, benefiting from abundant sunlight, wind, hydro, and geothermal resources. The continent has the potential to generate over 10 terawatts of solar power, equivalent to 40% of the world's total solar potential, and an estimated 180 gigawatts of wind energy potential. Countries like Egypt, Ethiopia, and Morocco are already investing in large-scale wind energy projects. Sustainable, responsible, and equitable exploitation of both fossil fuels and renewables is essential, considering the associated opportunities and risks. It is crucial to protect essential infrastructure and effectively integrate renewables.

[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/policies/green-deal/.

The energy resources of the African continent can significantly enhance global energy security, provide that their exploitation respects the environment, promote social development, and ensure economic benefits for the African populations. A balanced approach is essential, taking into account both the needs and aspirations of African countries alongside the global imperative to transition to a more sustainable energy future. Collaboration between the African Union and the Atlantic Alliance must proceed gradually and pragmatically, acknowledging emerging energy needs and addressing security concerns in a region marked by high competition for primary resources and instability. Geopolitical and geoeconomic variables need careful consideration to ensure stability and security.

Finally, although market integration in Africa has begun, stability hinges on a cooperative security framework that facilitates exchanges between north and south, as well as among south countries. Effective interaction between market actors and governmental bodies is crucial to ensuring energy security and shaping market regulation efficiently. In conclusion, future energy strategies must be comprehensive and innovative, considering the complex interplay of economic, political, social, and environmental actors. The African continent, with its vast energy resources and diverse energy landscape, plays a pivotal role in shaping the global energy future.

Dr **Nouzha Chekrouni** is a Senior Fellow at the Policy Center for the New South. She has extensive experience in academia, diplomacy, and political leadership. She has served as His Majesty's Ambassador to Canada (2009-2016), and Dean of the Council of Arab League Ambassadors to Canada (2015-2016). Dr Chekrouni was Minister for the Moroccan Community Living Abroad (2002-2007), a Member of Parliament (2002-2007), and the Minister for Women and Social Issues (1998-2002). She holds a bachelor's degree from the Philological Faculty at the University of Fez, a Post-Graduate Diploma, and a Ph.D. in Linguistics from the Université Sorbonne Nouvelle in Paris. Dr Chekrouni has also completed a Certificate in Ethics and International Relations at Harvard University. She is a 2016 Senior Fellow in Advanced Leadership at Harvard University and has taught linguistics at the Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences at the University of Meknes. Since 2020, Dr Chekrouni is a member of the Arab and Moroccan Network of Women Mediators for the UN Agenda "Women, Peace and Security".

Alessandro Politi
NDCF Director

POLITICAL SUMMARY

The concept of this high-level conference was drafted well before the famous Sahel crisis in Africa, when three military coups d'état, followed by others, provoked the depart of European and US forces present in the area to fight local terrorism, cutting long-standing ties especially with European countries like France. Even without these crises, the importance of Africa is self-evident, but these events have obviously sparked interest and heightened attention in the capitals, only to be superseded by other news in the media and slip below the required level of awareness, despite the work done on relevant partnerships and geographic areas by the NDC, the NDCF and the NSD-S Hub. In reality the whole Southern Region has been deliberately neglected for 15 years and only sheer political will allowed the drafting of the "Final Report of the Independent Expert Group supporting NATO's comprehensive and deep reflection process on the Southern Neighbourhood". This in turn allowed for the first time a realistic language in the Washington Summit's Final Communique.

While in the previous two years the focus was on the Mediterranean, this conference concentrated the attention on NATO-African (AU) Union collaboration in the domain of energy security of supply against a wider strategic backdrop. What these geographic areas have in common is the North-South buyer-supplier relationship under the pressure of the lack of Russian gas and oil supplies after the aggression against Ukraine. But while the Mediterranean Region, despite its divisions and lack of substantial South-South collaboration for political reasons, can envisage in due time the transition towards renewables and eventually green hydrogen, the situation in Africa is more complex.

The most mentioned issue is the great power competition for Africa's resources and markets, whereby their effort is also to achieve a stronger link either to the Washington or the Beijing consensus. In reality African countries, at different speeds and with varied approaches, have embraced the market system and want first and foremost fair trade, as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) shows clearly.

This fair trade implies a significant role for the sovereign state that clearly is not a neo-Liberalist approach, but is indispensable for a sound investment in the growth of one's own industrial base. A much stronger pressure comes instead from climate change, where both fossil buyers and suppliers are already walking a thin transition line by the continued use of fossil fuels in the hope to bridge the full transition towards renewables. In the current situation and without serious investments in especially Africa and the Global South, the North-South divide will continue to the detriment of the whole ecosphere, because a greener North will not compensate the emissions of more polluting power plants in the South.

NATO in its Strategic Concept and organizational structure has a clear interest in collaborating with African countries and particularly with the AU, but this must be qualified on both sides. On the Alliance's side, after the Washington Treaty, there must be a reasonable reallocation of resources towards the Southern Region, with a natural priority towards existing partners, some of them risk to pivot towards less friendly capitals. Regarding Africa in particular, NATO has three aspects to develop with different priority levels: cooperative security and, only when appropriate and possible, crisis prevention, is the first and foremost for evident reasons. By enhancing security and stability on equal terms with the AU, NATO can indirectly contribute to positively advance the twinned interests of energy security of supply and climate change. The third aspect closes the loop through the interaction between regional social foundations and the Organization, through the Women Peace and Security component.

On the AU's side there are evidently some national reserves about collaborating with the NATO for historic and political reasons (not least the management of the Libyan crisis). This brings among specialists a clearcut division in attitudes: one supporting a very gradual, cautious approach and another, more attentive to the pace of change in the continent, supporting a greater sense of urgency in engaging the AU. It the Italian Mattei Plan will garner sufficient economic support, it will politically strengthen the approach towards balanced regional partnerships.

In the end, some of the most important energy breakthroughs should come from the evolution and the positive effects of the AfCFTA, because: it plans to invest in an African Single Electricity Market); it has a Dispute Settlement Mechanism that could overcome some existing cross-border limitations and because it has been from the start designed to foster renewables (in line with the Agenda 2063 of the Paris Agreement). This possible development is supported by a receding scepticism about energy diversification across the continent.

Alessandro Politi is a global political and strategic analyst with 30 years of experience. Director since 12 years of the NATO Defense College Foundation. He teaches geopolitics and intelligence at the SIOI. He was senior researcher for the Italian MoD on Latin America, leading also the Global Outlook project. He has worked with four Defence Ministers, while consulting for other three major decision makers and several governmental bodies. He has published in various roles 50 books on strategic and security matters. Latest book: "Goodbye Merkel". His last report "IHEDN, Pole Luxembourg, Quelles postures de l'Union Européenne, jeu d'échecs ou jeu de rôles, vis-à-vis de l'Alliance du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord ?". Most recent podcast: "NATO and China in the Global Disorder", achieving 10.000 listeners in one week.

What are the opportunities and risks associated with energy portfolio diversification in Africa?

How to efficiently protect energy infrastructures in the continent?



SESSION I

AFRICA: MAPPING ENERGY DIVERSIFICATION

Workers drilling in the white dust at a gold mine in Namibia

CHAIR

MEHMET ÖĞÜTÇÜ

Chairman
London Energy Club
London

Mehmet Öğütçü is currently the Chair of Global Resources Partnership, a UK strategic advisory group, and serves as well as Chair of The Bosphorus Energy Club, and The London Energy Club. Earlier in his career, 1986 and 1994, he was an advisor to the late Turkish Prime Minister, Turgut Özal. After leaving the Foreign Service, Mr Ogutcu joined the International Energy Agency (IEA) as a senior staffer, heading the Eurasia and Asia-Pacific programme, and investment outreach for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). He is a globe-trotting speaker and writer on the energy-geopolitics-investment nexus. He speaks Chinese, English, French and Turkic languages.

"The biggest challenge in Africa is not about climate change, it is more about how to address energy poverty: more than 600 million people in Africa have no access to commercial energy. There is a great difficulty in attracting investments to Africa, but potential is huge.

Giuseppe Mistretta

Director for Sub-Saharan Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Rome

COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION ON AFRICAN ENERGY SOURCES: SITUATION AND SCENARIOS

A calculation was made by International Energy Agency (IEA), estimating that between € 80 and 120 billion per year will be required from now until 2050 to achieve widespread energy access across Africa.[1] However, achieving this goal is very challenging. In 2019, only € 11 billion were spent in energy plants, especially renewables, and in 2021, this figure increased to only € 20 billion. Otherwise, the 600 million people without electricity today will remain without access for the foreseeable future.

Collaboration rather than competition is needed, but the geopolitical situation does not guarantee that collaboration can be achieved in this field. The scramble for Africa is evident across every sector, including energy. Currently, there is no evidence of direct conflict in the energy sector. Each party pursues its own interests, but advancing our own interest could also serve Africa's interests because, ultimately, electrifying Africa benefits everyone.

At the present, there is no evidence of major conflicts among key players, but global unrest inevitably affects Africa as well. Moreover, another factor rarely put in value is the widespread instability across African countries. How can we justify large-scale infrastructure investments amid ongoing insurgencies, fights, criminality, terrorism? Parts of the region are beyond government control, and this goes up from the Horn of Africa to countries like Sudan. This is the primary challenge: how to establish onshore energy plants which, given that solar panels and wind turbines are

[1] https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050.

supposed to be in inland locations? Given the importance of security, the protection of these plants is a big challenge.

The second major challenge is the African debt. How can substantial infrastructure investments be made when is indebted, and some countries are in default? Where is the liquidity? Some countries are totally illiquid, and those in default are insolvent. Are Western countries, the international system, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund convinced of the necessity to inject funds despite the debt, and proceed with essential investments in Africa for the foreseeable future? There is no final answer. Discussions are ongoing in various forums including the G20, G7, African Development Bank, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. A comprehensive transitional plan addressing climate change, debt, security for the electricity diversification, and transition is crucial. All these issues are linked together, tackling them piecemeal will not yield effective results.

Finally, two things should be emphasised: it is important that perspectives in Africa have changed. Previously, there was scepticism about diversification in respect of traditional sources like oil and gas. The scepticism was confirmed during the summit held in Italy in January, where President Ruto recognised that the time has come for Africa to embrace renewable energy and fight against the climate change. This shift implies new investments, suggesting that many of the obstacles encountered in the past have been surmounted.

What role does Italy play? African countries view Italy as an advocate within the major international forums to which Italy belongs (European Union, G7, G20 etc.). Africa expects us to represent the voice of its 54 countries in these forums. Ultimately, Italy fulfils this role by seeking to advocate and contribute positively on these issues.

What role can NATO play? Initially, there was significant fear among African states towards NATO. However, the situation has evolved. Numerous meetings took place at the African Union in Addis Ababa, shifting Africa's sceptical stance towards NATO. While not entirely overcome, this scepticism has improved because NATO has capabilities beyond warfare and defence. A challenge remains in persuading African countries that NATO can contribute to securing energy plants. If the aim is to electrify all of Africa using onshore plants, security becomes a major issue. Alongside African ownership, there must be a focus on protecting these installations. Otherwise, investing in infrastructure would be useless.

Previously Italian Ambassador to Angola (2009-2014) and Ethiopia (2014-2017), Director General **Giuseppe Mistretta** spent most of his professional life in Africa. He has also served in the USA, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UK, and Libya. He was Director for Sub-Saharan Africa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. An accomplished author, he has written several books, such as *Un ponte lungo quattro secoli* (Gangemi Editore, 2013), *Angola. Un Paese moderno al centro dell'Africa* (Polaris, 2014), and *I Noti Ospiti* (Greco e Greco, 2018). Director General has contributed to various newspapers, including *La Repubblica* and *Il Corriere della Sera*.

AHMET EVIN

Founding Dean, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Professor Emeritus, Sabancı University, Istanbul

REGIONAL POWERS' ROLE IN AFRICA

In Africa, there is competition for resources but there is also collaboration among medium powers. However, when it comes to major powers, there is less collaboration and more competition, often leading to confrontation. Africa's rapidly growing population and increasing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, rank it second only to India, China, and Southeast Asia in terms of growth rate.[1] Its economic potential has triggered competition for resources, influence, and market access. EU's extensive bilateral connections with energy producing countries in Africa have been intensified in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis.[2] When it comes to the major powers, the US total trade volume with Africa is at a level of engagement amounting to $ 64 billion, that pales in comparison with China's trade volume of $ 254 billion; China has also made significant investments in energy resources and minerals. Surprisingly, Russia's investments in Africa are minimal, accounting for less than 1% of its Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) globally. Despite an annual trade of only $ 18 billion, Russia has successfully penetrated African markets in search of natural resources and alliances against the West.[3]

India, another global power-seeking influence, also perceives an opportunity to engage in Africa. Historically, it has appealed to the frustration of African countries with the US-led liberal order. India has made significant progress in the continent by advocating for the African Union's membership in the G20. Africa's rapidly growing population, projected to increase by 1 billion people by 2050, and its rising per capita GDP, will demand greater quantities of energy and other natural resources

[1] https://www.statista.com/statistics/1121013/gdp-growth-rate-of-african-countries-by-country/.

[2] https://ecfr.eu/article/separate-to-integrate-eu-enlargement-and-the-trouble-with-bilateral-disputes/.

[3] https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-still-progressing-africa-whats-limit.

for domestic consumption, adding another dimension of competition. Last year 600 million Africans lacked access to electricity, and nearly a billion lacked access to clean cooking facilities. As its GDP per capita increases fast, more Africans will require increased quantities of energy for daily living, work, and transportation. Africa's economic growth also signifies new opportunities for FDI in the continent.

Against this background, attention should be directed to the middle powers in the region. Israel, to begin with, focusses its diplomatic activities in the region on discouraging local states from supporting the Palestinian cause and on countering Iran's influence. Israel also offers high-tech assets for domestic and international security, as well as in-demand agricultural and mining technologies, offering valuable resources to partners. Lastly, Mossad became actively involved in East Africa following the 1998 US bombing in Dar Salam and Nairobi, with increased security cooperation after the Westgate shopping mall bomb attack in 2013. Israel also engages in economic development cooperation, particularly in water access and renewable energy solutions such as solar energy.

The Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, like Israel, primarily focus on East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Four years ago, a Saudi initiative led to the signing of the Red Sea Pact[4] by eight countries, aimed at enhancing security and boosting trade in the Red Sea corridor, which traditionally handled 30% of global trade before Houthi's disruptions. The UAE has made massive investments in port infrastructure across a broad region encompassing Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal, and Mozambique. Both UAE and Saudi Arabia also make considerable investments across the continent.

Turkey has been the most active regional power, making Africa one of its main policy priorities and implementing a comprehensive strategy that includes economic and cultural diplomacy, with a focus on education. As a result, bilateral trade between Turkey and Africa has grown significantly, surpassing $ 40 billion compared to $ 5 billion in 2003. The strategy also involved expanding airline connections, with Turkish Airlines now serving over 60 destinations in Africa. This network not only facilitates trade between Turkish and African markets but also connects African passengers to more than 250 destinations outside Africa.

Turkey's successful engagement with Africa has been praised from observers across the globe. Three years ago, a collection of scholarly essays was published on Turkish's approach to Africa. Despite these achievements, it is important to keep these figures in perspective. Turkey's trade volume with the entire African continent remains only 1/5 of its trade volume with the EU. In terms of energy, a recent

[4] https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20200108-new-red-sea-alliance-formed-saudi-arabia-notable-exclusions.

development is that a Turkish company's powership will double its supply of energy to African coastal states.[5]

The final point is one of the many paradoxes concerning Africa's potential versus its needs. Regarding the NATO connection, there are several considerations. Firstly, a military alliance like NATO could greatly benefit from Africa's available energy resources. Secondly, the competition for Africa's resources and markets also involves efforts to align African countries with different economic models, exemplified by the Washington consensus or the Beijing consensus. Sometimes, countries find themselves between the two models, recently referred to as an anchor of consensus.

For the West to succeed in encouraging sub-Saharan African states to embrace the liberal order, thereby achieving predictability and stability, it should adopt an inclusive approach. This approach must recognise the significant role of the sovereign state and avoid alienating sovereignty-conscious Africans by appearing to promote so much an unfettered free market economy to the extent of diminishing the government's role. The West's relations with Africa reflect the increasingly divergent views and political priorities of today's multipolar world. They also highlight the different views among NATO member states, who do not always share the same values. NATO boosts a proud history as the world's most powerful alliance, maintaining peace in the transatlantic area. However, as NATO celebrates its 75th anniversary, it should not be complacent but rather tackle the centrifugal forces that threaten its unity.

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[5] Turkey is home of Karpowership, a builder, operator, and owner of a fleet of powerships. These vessels are barge- or ship-mounted floating power plants, that can operate multifuel (heavy fuel oil-HFO, diesel fuel, and/or natural gas).

Massimo Amato
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ENERGY DIVERSIFICATION WITH AFRICA: WHICH FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS?

In Africa there is a huge problem in terms of renewable energy, these latter only representing the 3% of energy resources and, in some areas, even less, like the 1% in West Africa. In those countries with low percentage of renewable energy, more opportunities can be found due to lower prices and the increased availability of equipment. Africa's countries also deal with the absence of an adequate electric grid; off-grid solutions are needed, but they can only come from renewables, and this is the key point. Still, Africa has a huge potential in renewables' production, particularly with solar energy, and this is fundamental for the relationship between Africa and the European Union.

In the end, three aspects need to be intertwined and kept together: energy diversification, EU-Africa relationships, and finance.

Africa is a vast and diversified continent of geostrategic importance for various energy sources, including oil, gas, uranium, rare earths, solar energy, and land. It is impossible to know in advance whether Africa will be capable of managing and fully take stock of its potential in the medium term or not, but for sure there is potential. Africa no longer aspires to asymmetrical relations with other partners, it does not aspire to postcolonial or humanitarian relationships. The welfare-minded idea of Africa has also ended at a symbolic level. What Africa aspires to is fair trade, even among African countries: this is the rationale of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)[1], the largest free trade agreement that has been signed until now. This is also the request that Africa has towards its potential partners.

[1] https://www.eac.int/trade/international-trade/trade-agreements/african-continental-free-trade-area-afcfta-agreement.

Which potential partners? Looking at the North, for instance, Europe is a potential partner. When it comes to energy, the main issue for the European continent is its complete dependence on other countries. Until now Europe, with its long tradition in colonial history, has poorly managed relationships with Africa. Another issue Europe is facing is the weakening of France's hegemonic power. However, the temptation to replace one weak hegemony with another should be avoided. The idea is that the EU *as a whole* has to find and promote new forms of relationships with Africa.

How to shape these relationships? This depends firstly on the type of energy sources considered (whether it is oil, gas, or other sources) as well as on territorial proximity: is it the Southern Africa or the Northern Africa? These are the main differences to consider. Deepening the renewable and diversification issue, the ongoing war in Europe has put together two interconnected goals: the substitution of an existing dominant gas supplier and the need to switch to renewable energies. This is the essence of the REPowerEU,[2] a very ambitious plan. This acceleration highlights various constraints, particularly stabilisation and industrial constraints, given Europe's lack of production in solar panels and batteries. There is also an issue related to land, as the goals of REPowerEU involve the use of 9.000 square kilometres of land.

In this sense, the opportunity to look outward is crucial, as the southern Mediterranean region - with its vast deserts - offers abundant land and sunlight. If compared to the EU, the south of Mediterranean would have a +240% percentage of efficiency (in terms of sun exposition and solar trackers), by putting solar panels in the desert. Just to fulfil 1/3 of the entire REPowerEU, Europe would need a flat square of approximately 40 km in the desert, not seeable from the satellites mostly. The academic community proposes indeed a Mediterranean community of renewables. In order to do so, a possible solution would be to make a connection to EU with voltage submarine cables, to be financed with a Public-Private Partnership[3] in infrastructure strategy investments.

A solar plant represents a secure investment: its costs and revenue potential are predictable, involving only the initial capital expenditure, without the issues associated with oil, gas, etc. In this sense, the need for low yield but safe assets and investments is very high in Europe to stabilise the portfolios of investors. Even if public investments (i.e., public debt) in these directions are made, the market is

[2] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en.

[3] https://www.rgs.mef.gov.it/VERSIONE-E/institutional_activities/cross_cutting_activities/public_private_partnerships/.

willing to finance public infrastructure strategies with special purpose vehicles (such as special bonds) providing this possibility.

What is the idea of the Mediterranean community? To engage and involve both sides in the same project. A collaborative project with shared advantages together with the need to protect and securitise the whole project. Since every power plant is a potential war target, the low density of solar plants makes them less endangered by attacks than, for instance, a nuclear central; because a point target can be destroyed by a single missile, an area target not.

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CLAUDIA GAZZINI

Senior Libya Analyst, International Crisis Group, Tripoli

THE ENERGY SUPPLY SITUATION IN LIBYA AND ITS REGIONAL REPERCUSSIONS

In theory, Libya is a textbook example of a rentier State. It holds the largest reserves of crude oil in Africa and is currently the second largest exporter of crude oil after Nigeria, with exports averaging 1,2 million barrels per day (bpd). Libya is also a significant exporter of natural gas, linked to Europe through an underwater gas pipeline running from the Wafa field to the west of Tripoli down to Gela in the island of Sicily. With ample sunshine and space for renewable energy, Libya holds potential. This makes Libya an interesting country worth examination.

The reality is that Libya is a failed rentier State, politically divided into two rival administrations.

The following map of the oil and gas infrastructure in Libya was drafted by the Crisis Group for a report published in 2016. Since then, nothing has changed: infrastructures are still divided in same terms. As the map shows, the East of the country, meaning a good part of the oil and gas infrastructure, is under the control of the Libyan National Army Forces (al-Jaysh al-Waṭaniyy al-Lībii) of General Haftar and their East-based government in Tobruk; in Western Libya, the internationally recognised government in Tripoli controls directly the territory of the remaining energy infrastructures and the pipeline that connects northwestern Libya to Europe. This division persists today, making Libya a significantly failed rentier state where there is no unified government to make decisions on investments and strategies. The country is reliant on oil and gas revenues, with 98% of public expenditure dependent on exports, and 60% of that amount allocated to salaries.



Source: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/189-after-showdown-libyas-oil-crescent#map-46562-1.

In recent years, since the war in Ukraine, there has been a focus on increasing gas production in Libya to offset the loss of Russian gas supply to Europe, that has had nefarious consequences for Libya. There was a deal between the two rival administrations: its objective was to ensure that both sides would continue to produce and export oil without conflicts or closures. In return, both sides would receive the profits of these export, mostly off the books.

The consequences for Libya were very detrimental, as the status quo was reinforced by providing both factions in the Libyan conflict with revenues from ongoing oil sales, along with international support for this oil arrangement. Firstly, there is no incentive for these factions to compromise and seek a political solution to the Libyan crisis. The UN-led political process is stalled due to international interests; a deal mediated by the USA through the UAE prioritised the export of oil and gas so heavily that both parties are willing to maintain the status quo to ensure it.

Officially, the revenues go to Tripoli. Unofficially, this is the second point, a system allows eastern non-recognised authorities to receive the windfalls, partially

through oil smuggling. While the push to export gas and oil has consolidated the political status quo, the other consequence, third point, is that it has increased smuggling. Libya sells oil locally at highly subsidised prices, around Euro 0,3 per litre. Currently, it exports oil and gas and, in a barter agreement, receives refined fuels. There is great opacity in the pricing of these refined fuels, but Libya imports almost double the amount of refined fuels it needs. The excess is subsidised and then used to support the smuggling of refined oil. Various authorities across the country profit between $ 1-2 billion annually through this smuggling scheme.

The fourth nefarious consequence of this situation is that predation has increased, creating billionaires at the expense of the country and its people. Ironically, Libya's banks have no cash, and most public sector employees have not received their salaries during the past two months. People are humiliated while huge amount of revenues flow into the pockets of happy few through this subsidised fuel smuggling system.

In theory, Libya is envisioned as a country that could soon produce 2-3 million bpd of oil. That is the public rhetoric about Libya. However, the dysfunctional situation inside the country, the dilapidated public spending system, and the inability to agree on investments, prevent progress in that direction. Regarding renewables, Libya has 0% renewable energy. Because smuggling subsidised fuel and importing fuel at the public coffer's expense is so profitable, there is little economic incentive for the governmental actors to invest in renewables, despite the country's potential.

Dr **Claudia Gazzini** is the International Crisis Group's Senior Analyst for Libya since 2012. Between October 2017 and March 2018, she also served as policy advisor to Ghassan Salamé, Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). Dr Gazzini travels regularly throughout Libya, and researches and produces reports on security, politics, and economic governance of the country, including its oil sector. Prior to joining the International Crisis Group, Dr Gazzini worked for the Associated Press in Rome and for Reuters in Jakarta. She was Max Weber fellow at the European University Institute in Fiesole (Florence) and Visiting Fellow at the Program of African Studies at Northwestern University (IL). Dr Gazzini did her post-graduate studies in Middle Eastern History at Princeton University and Oxford University.

How to take into account geopolitical and geoeconomic variables in terms of energy security of supply?

What approaches can best support the cooperation between AU and NATO?

SESSION II

AU-NATO: FURTHERING A PRAGMATIC COLLABORATION

African Union headquarters where NATO's liaison office is also located, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

CHAIR

ANDREA CELLINO

Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute Switzerland, Geneva

Andrea Cellino holds a MA in Political Science (University of Torino) and a Master's in Contemporary History (University of California, San Diego). He was Head of the North Africa Desk at DCAF, the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, from 2015 to 2023. Previously, Mr Cellino spent years doing fieldwork for the OSCE in Ukraine and in the Balkans. He has been Deputy Secretary General for Policy at the NATO Parliamentary (Brussels) directing PA's outreach programmes with parliaments in the MENA region and in Eastern Europe. Mr Cellino also published several analyses. He is a member of the Scientific Board of the NDCF, a member of the IAI and of the IIHL.

> ***Is there something that NATO can do in Africa to provide increased security, according to its mandate? Could NATO provide an example, a model, for collective cooperation to the African countries?***

Julian Wieczorkiewicz

Policy Officer, Climate and Energy Security Section. Innovation, Hybrid and Cyber Division, NATO HQ, Brussels

ENERGY SECURITY OF SUPPLY: THE BIG PICTURE AND CONSEQUENCES FROM THE UKRAINE WAR

NATO, as an organisation, does not engage in legislative or policymaking activities; rather, it operates as a security-focussed entity and a military alliance. Within this framework, all energy-related initiatives at NATO Headquarters are approached through a security perspective.

Currently, two paramount issues dominate the agenda: Ukraine and the energy transition. Ukraine's significance stems from Russia's ongoing efforts over the past 18 months to disrupt the country's power infrastructures. The repercussions of living without electricity are profound, impacting essential aspects of daily life.

Meanwhile, the energy transition is rapidly accelerating. The direction of this shift is clear, with inevitable implications for military operations. NATO Headquarters' focus is on mitigating any disruptions resulting from this transition.

The energy transition acceleration is driven by three primary factors. First, climate policies have long influenced the energy landscape. Second, Russia's actions have expedited this transition, notably through the weaponisation of energy supplies against the Collective West.[1] This tactic was evident in the summer of 2021 when Russia deliberately reduced gas levels in storage sites across Europe, causing a surge in gas prices. The situation worsened with the onset of the invasion, marking Russia's aggressive military campaign. Gazprom swiftly initiated gas supply cuts to Europe,[2]

[1] https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2024/04/26/russias-hybrid-war-against-the-west/index.html.

[2] https://it.euronews.com/2022/06/15/gazprom-nuovi-tagli-del-gas-alleuropa.

citing various pretexts and exacerbating tensions. Some European countries refused to comply, further straining relations and leading to the designation of certain nations as «unfriendly states», compounding the crisis. Consequently, European energy prices surged dramatically, reaching up to € 175 MWh (per MegaWatt hour) in the spring of 2022, an exorbitant figure compared to the current rate of around € 50.

Russia's capacity to undertake such actions is well-known. Whether it served Russia's strategic interests remains subject to deliberation. Nevertheless, these events led to a notable surge in gas prices across Europe, peaking at € 350 MWh during the winter of 2022, reaching unprecedented levels. Consequently, global perturbations, including developments in Yemen and the Middle East, alongside climate anomalies, significantly disrupted energy markets worldwide, increasing their volatility.

NATO and EU policy responses were prompted by these developments, particularly Russia's actions. Measures included increased deployment of renewables, decreased gas consumption, and the adoption of alternative energy sources. A notable surge in private sector investments in photovoltaics, wind energy, and nuclear power, underscores the inevitable path of the energy transition.

For every dollar invested in the oil industry, an equivalent dollar is now being invested by the private sector in photovoltaics. When considering wind and nuclear energy alongside photovoltaics, the ratio shifts to $ 1 to $ 1,7. This clearly indicates the trajectory ahead: a path forward with no retreat. It is essential to highlight this because a significant part of the response involves mitigating the volumes formerly supplied by Russia, amounting to 150 bcm. Previously conveyed through pipelines, this gas flow has drastically diminished to 20 bcm, with surplus gas wastefully flared in Russia, exacerbating climate concerns.

The climate change repercussions will be profoundly felt in Africa, impacting its economy and energy sector. Global competition for gas resources has intensified, favouring those with deeper pockets, thereby altering the energy landscape. The energy transition is advancing rapidly, portending substantial global changes. Certainly, Africa will not be immune.

Julian Wieczorkiewicz is a graduate of the College of Europe and the University of Warsaw. He contributes his expertise to NATO's Innovation, Hybrid, and Cyber (IHC) division, focusing on energy security. He served also as a desk officer for Russia at NATO's Political Affairs and Security Policy Division (PASP). Mr Wieczorkiewicz also worked at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he held diplomatic positions. He has been a researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the European Commission. His contributions to the discourse on energy and climate security have been important thanks to extensive publications and interviews he held.

ANDREA GRAZIOSO

Senior Analyst, NATO Strategic Direction South HUB, Naples

POSSIBLE EVOLUTIONS OF THE AU-NATO COLLABORATION

The Hub[1] is a key outcome of NATO's 2016 political decision to enhance engagement with the Southern Hemisphere, particularly the Southern Neighbourhood. Positioned within the broader context of the Southern Region, the Hub acts as a bridge between NATO and its partners in the South. It fosters a deeper understanding of southern issues within NATO's political discourse while effectively communicating important messages to its Allies across the wider Mediterranean region.

NATO and the African Union have maintained a relationship since 2005, with the AU itself being founded in 2002. This support has been guided by three fundamental principles: African ownership, African Union requests, and coordination with other international organisations. Initially sparked by a request from the African Union for logistic support in AU-led operations and peacekeeping missions, this cooperation has evolved over time. A milestone was reached in 2014 when NATO established a liaison office in Addis Ababa at the AU headquarters.

Since then, various avenues of collaboration have been pursued, including military-to-military dialogues and ongoing logistical support for AU-led peacekeeping operations. Additionally, a comprehensive training and education programme has been established, allowing African officers to participate in NATO schools, notably those located in Oberammergau, Germany. Furthermore, structural and systemic assistance has been provided to bolster AU's staff capabilities, encompassing targeted training initiatives aimed at enhancing early warning systems and improving readiness for the African Standby Force (ASF),[2] a critical component of shared objectives.

[1] https://thesouthernhub.org/about.

[2] https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1.

The Hub collaborates closely with the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT),[3] a unit within the AU Commission dedicated to addressing terrorism-related challenges. Despite the absence of a formal security agreement between NATO and the AU, collaboration thrives through joint activities addressing terrorism in regions like the Sahel and other parts of Africa. This partnership is facilitated by Hub's unique position, that operates independently from the intelligence community. Consequently, it serves as an ideal intermediary, enabling fruitful discussions and engagements on critical security matters with our esteemed partners without affecting sensitivities related to security concerns.

Initially framed as *support*, the evolving relationship between NATO and the AU has transitioned towards *cooperation*, reflecting progress in discussions. The liaison office in Addis Ababa plays a pivotal role in assessing the depth and breadth of this cooperation.

Whitin NATO, an ongoing political debate persists. NATO's primary focus remains on transatlantic security, particularly safeguarding the European continent. This focus stems from the resurgence of warfare in Europe, particularly the conflict in Ukraine, a nation rapidly adopting transatlantic values. Consequently, at the recent meeting of 40 Defence ministers, discussion primarily revolved around European security and the situation in Ukraine. Additionally, specific conversation occurred on broadening and deepening relations with the Southern Neighbourhood. Wording on this matter is predicted during the upcoming NATO summit, scheduled for the 9-11th of July in Washington. This signifies that presidents and heads of government are expected to endorse decisions regarding NATO's stance at the summit. It is a work in process, with various hypotheses under consideration.

Similar dynamics are observed within the AU due to its inherent complexity. In the analysis community, the concept of «systems of systems» is frequently discussed. Both NATO and the AU exemplify such entities, characterised by their complexity. As a result, the evolution of their relationships requires extreme caution. Convergence in this regard is possible, including pragmatic agreements on subjects of common interest, such as energy.

[3] https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/2-3591-static-about-african-centre-for-study-and-research-on-terrorism-ACSRT.

Andrea Grazioso graduated in Economic and Financial Politics and spent many years as an analyst both in Italy and abroad. Since 2011, Mr Grazioso is an Adjunct Professor at Pavia University; in the years 2012-2018 he became a Senior Civil Servant in the Office of the Italian Minister of Defence and Advisor to the Minister. He also has been co-author for the Military Policy (2012), for example. In 2018 Mr Grazioso was Economic Advisor to Teneo Strategy LCC and then joined NATO as International Civilian (2019). At the moment, he is Senior Analyst in the Comprehensive Research and Analysis Section of NATO Strategic Direction – South HUB.

Johan van den Berg

Head of Secretariat, Africa-EU Energy Partnership, Bonn

ENERGY COLLABORATION WITH AFRICA: THE DIFFICULT FOSSIL/RENEWABLE BALANCE

The stark contrast between the potential outcomes of the African energy future will take centre stage. On the one hand, there is a dystopian and chaotic scenario that poses significant security risks. On the other hand, there is the prospect of a harmonious, interdependent, and well-planned African energy future, a vision already embraced by all African ministers, representing immense promise and potential.

The Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP),[1] a dialogue forum between Africa and Europe, works closely with the European Commission, the African Union Commission, and the African Union Development Agency. Additionally, our Steering group includes members from AU Commission, European Commission, Italy, Egypt, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and Germany,[2] with the majority of fundings currently provided by the European Commission.

Energy poverty remains a significant challenge in Africa, contributing to instability, state fragility, and migration, that create fertile ground for conflicts and terrorism. Nevertheless, Africa has a clear vision for its energy future. The African Continental Master Plan (CMP),[3] endorsed by all African ministers, outlines a roadmap towards a Pan-African system characterised by interconnected power pools predominantly powered by renewable energy sources. This ambitious plan aims to quadruple energy generation in Africa by 2040 while maintaining current emission levels and

[1] https://africa-eu-energy-partnership.org/.

[2] https://africa-eu-energy-partnership.org/about-the-aeep/.

[3] https://nepad.org/continental-master-plan .

significantly boosting GDP.

The implementing cost of this plan is estimated at $ 1,3 trillion, significantly less than the cost of individual efforts. The benefits include enhanced peace and security, improved governance, and substantial progress in climate protection. However, achieving this vision requires urgent action and collaboration. In terms of NATO's role, there is a natural alignment of interests between ensuring stability, promoting good order, and supporting Africa's energy transition. Urgency is paramount, given the momentum for change. While gradual and pragmatic approaches have their place, the scale and urgency of the energy transition demand swift action.

In conclusion, the financial resources required for this transition are within reach, primarily through leveraging private sector investment with appropriate government support. By aligning efforts and mobilising resources, the vision of a harmonious African energy future can be turned into reality.

Johan van den Berg is the Head of Secretariat of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP) in Bonn, Germany. Previously, he has been the CEO of the South African Wind Energy Association (SAWEA, 2011-2016) and Chair of the South African Renewable Energy Council. Mr van den Berg spoke at 47 conferences among South Africa, USA, Europe, and Asia, earning extensive media engagement on television, radio, and printed media. He has also been Director of Climate Finance at BioTherm Energy (2004-2011). In his working life, he spent a lot of years in energy and climate protection work.

How do market actors in Africa interact to ensure energy security?

How to regulate markets and promote regional stability in Africa?

SESSION III

THE CHALLENGE OF MARKET INTEGRATION

A ship in a container terminal in the Port of Lome, Togo.

CHAIR

JESSICA OBEID

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Jessica Obeid holds a Master's degree in Political sciences and a Bachelor's degree in electrical engineering. She is an energy engineer and policy consultant with more than 15 years of experience; she is Head of Energy at MEIS. Founding Partner at New Energy Consult (Dubai), Ms Obeid has collected many work experiences over the years: Senior Advisor for Azure Strategy consultancy (London) and Non-Resident Scholar at Middle East Institute in Washington D.C., for example. Ms Obeid also served as chief energy engineer at the UN Development Programme in Beirut. Ms Obeid is a widely published author also collaborating with international media outlets such as New York Times, Washington Post. Among the prizes she has been awarded with: US State Department's Techwomen and UK FCDO International Leader's fellowships.

"Market integration and regional collaboration are crucial for a sustainable and resilient future. Much has changed in the global energy systems with technological advancements leading to new sources of energy supply and increasing focus on decarbonisation.

Leonardo Bellodi
Adjunct Professor, Luiss Business School, Rome

MARKET INTEGRATION AND REGULATION: THE REGIONAL APPROACH AND THE AFRICAN FREE TRADE AREA

There are three major factors to concentrate upon. The first is the interdependence between energy and geopolitics: the two spheres are closely interconnected, and geopolitics cannot be discussed without addressing energy (and vice versa). Energy is indeed driven by geopolitical factors, relationships and issues. The second factor to focus on is related to human nature: particularly, the human tendency to act only in case of emergency. A couple years ago, everybody was paying attention to peak prices and the possible gas shortage due to the Russian war. Concern emerged about Europe's dependence on Russian gas imports. China, Italy, and other countries were piling up stocks of gas and efforts were made to find solutions, to cut dependence on Russian gas, diversify import routes and sources.

Now the situation in completely different and it seems the emergency is over: gas prices, except for the oil peak, are good; consumers' utility bills are lower than two years ago, and the situation appears settled. Nevertheless, the situation is not fixed, problems can still raise in the future. Importing routes and countries have been diversified but, in 2023, 10 billion cubic metres (bcm) of liquefied natural gas (LNG) have been imported from Russia.[1] Gas is also imported from the USA, but some consumers and industrials are concerned that increased exports drive up domestic prices, urging the government to limit export licenses to prevent further price hikes.

Routes have been diversified, and a lot of gas is now imported through the South Corridor, such as Turkey.[2] But can this country be trusted? European Institutions are

[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-gas-supply/.

[2] https://www.upstreamonline.com/energy-security/turkey-and-azerbaijan-turn-up-the-volume-in-

unhappy with the state of press freedom, political movements and other matters. We are between a rock and hard place: on one side Moscow, on the other side Ankara. Nothing is easy. Imports also come from North Africa (Algeria, Libya, Egypt, etc.) but uncertainty in still arises when dealing with these countries. While everybody is concerned about Ukraine, Iran, and Israel, many problems in other African countries still persist, including the continued imports, even with a mild winter. New infrastructures must be built in Europe to improve interconnection. Gas cannot be imported in southern Europe from northern Europe due to a lack of interconnection, so it is time to address this issue.

Last major factor: the energy transition. The necessity of the energy transition is acknowledged. The phasing-out of hydrocarbons, especially gas and oil, is essential for future generations, and so is a world reliant on renewables. But, even if I am pro-transition, firstly, it should be noted that in 2022, we had a peak of oil production. Secondly, gas is imported from several countries such as Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia, which are all rentier states. In these countries, everything is subsidised by the government. While capitals like Abu Dhabi and Doha are gradually diversifying their economies, other similar countries in North Africa have not. So, considering a scenario where oil and gas are totally eradicated, what will happen to these populations? How will the people be remunerated by the government? What will they do without these revenues? They are still relying on these revenues. What will happen? What will western countries do in case of "new" emergencies like economic migration?

It is hard to answer these questions, but we need to move forward in the right direction which is renewable energy.

Leonardo Bellodi has more than 30 years of international experience in governmental and international relations, law, and advocacy. Qualified in international public law arbitration, Mr Bellodi has worked for the United Nations and then held numerous positions at Eni, most recently as Executive Vice-President Governmental Affairs. He is Senior Advisor at the Libyan Investment Authority, and he covered the same position in International Relations for various firms, expert in geopolitics and in the energy sector. Mr Bellodi values sharing knowledge and continuous training, and therefore collaborates as a Visiting Professor and teacher in master classes and University courses (Università Cattolica Milano, University of Padova, Luiss Guido Carli Rome). Mr Bellodi is author of several university manuals and columnist for Italian and international newspapers. His latest book is *The New Sovereignty* published in Italian by Giappichelli in 2020 and in English by Claeys & Casteels in 2021.

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Afaf Zarkik

Senior Economist, Policy Center for the New South, Rabat

AFRICA'S SUSTAINABLE MARKET FOR SUSTAINABLE COLLABORATIONS

There are two certain paths for global economic development in the future: the first one is green growth[1] (both neutral and clean growth), and the second one is Africa as the final frontier. There is still so much to be done in Africa. Taking the example of Morocco, the 2030 Moroccan energy strategy's[2] goal is to reach 52% installed capacity in renewable energy. We have the green hydrogen roadmap, therefore a lot of seawater desalination stations also due to competition over other resources. We are also hosting the World Cup, so we need interconnections, hence, we are building a fast railroad. We need roads. We need schools.

Africa still presents lack of access to electricity, lack of access to clean cooking and blackout issues,[3] costing the continent 5% GDP every year. The electricity mix is still dominated by fossil fuels, representing about 80% of the electricity generated.

So much still needs to be done, but the public budgets are extremely constrained by debts and other important socioeconomic projects. Another important question is the cost of capital in Africa, which is one of the highest in the world (if not the highest). To give an example, it is five times the weighted average cost of capital in China and other developed countries. This is the reason why Africa received only 1,5% of Private Sector Investments in renewable energies in the world, which is only about 3,2 billion compared to 2,8 trillion worldwide.

Literature also underlines the lack of technical and human skills: this underscores the importance of collaboration among African countries *but also* between the North and the South. There is an African expression according to which «*alone you can go faster,*

[1] https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1447.

[2] https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/moroccos-energy-transition-prioritizing-natural-gas-embracing-green-hydrogen-and.

[3] https://www.africarivista.it/blackout-internet-riparazioni-e-soluzioni-alternative/227723/

but together we will go further» and this approach is applied to the regional cooperation to address energy deficiency in Africa. This approach has been also applied from the 1990s, through the regional power pools. Among these latter, one of the most successful is the Southern African Power Pool. One of the most successful ones is the Southern African Power Pool,[4] but I think it was because it was driven less by an economic rationale and a bit more a by post-apartheid mentality. South Africa wanted to play the role of regional leader and also be neighbourly to its adjoining countries, in fact it supplied electricity to them in difficult times. This was prompted, actually, by extreme climate events in the 1990s that compromised the hydropower capacities in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. So, there was some kind of complementarity that was created between renewable energies and coal power plants that existed and the electric energy surplus that existed in South Africa at the time.

The overall objective is therefore supporting renewable energy through regional power integration supported by spatial and temporal synergies and achieved through regional collaboration. Regional power pools also present an important business case because of their scalability: in other words, it is much less expensive to invest in a regional manner rather than in individual countries. This can lead to extensive cost cutting: some studies indicate, for instance, that in the region of the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS), about $ 30 billion have been saved.

Nevertheless, these integration efforts have not been very successful. There is a lack of trust among countries, in addition to the unwillingness to liberalise electricity markets, mostly for social reasons. This also involves deficit investments in generation and transmission, in addition to the tendency to prefer bilateral rather than regional trading.

Through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement things might move in the right direction for African regional power pools. First, because it intends to scale investments in infrastructure (and one of these is the African Single Electricity Market).[5] The second reason is that the Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Mechanism[6] can resolve some of the cross-border limitations to

[4] https://www.sapp.co.zw. The SAPP was created in August 1995 at the SADC summit held in Kempton Park, South Africa, when member governments of SADC (excluding Mauritius) signed an Inter-Governmental Memorandum of Understanding for the formation of an electricity power pool in the region under the name of the Southern African Power Pool. The ministers responsible for energy in the SADC region signed the Revised Inter-Governmental Memorandum of Understanding on 23 February 2006. The SAPP has twelve member countries represented by their respective electric power utilities organised through SADC (Southern African Development Community).

[5] https://au.int/en/afsem.

[6] https://bowmanslaw.com/insights/harnessing-africas-free-trade-agenda-afcfta-protocol-on-the-sett-

cooperation. Finally, since the AfCFTA has built on Agenda 2063 and on the Paris agreement, it is more incline to support renewable energy.

Afaf Zarkik is a graduate in Energy strategies from Ecole des Mines (Paris) and an economist at Policy Center for the New South (Rabat). She has also a Bachelor of Science in Engineering and Management Science (Al Akhawayn University). Before joining the Policy Center's team, Ms Zarkik was a senior analyst in asset management, an analyst in oil and gas mergers and acquisition. Her areas of research are, ad example, energy commodities monitoring and energy transition and sustainable development policy analysis.

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Giacomo Luciani
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A GEOECONOMIC VIEW OF AFRICAN ENERGY MARKET INTEGRATION

A focus will be placed on a specific form of energy: hydropower. It is surprising that, when discussing about renewable energies and the energy transition, thoughts go exclusively to solar and wind power, and never to hydropower. Solar and wind are clean and renewable sources, but they are not dispatchable; they cannot be controlled, which means we cannot guarantee their availability when needed. The issue is not their variability, but rather the lack of control over them. That has important technical and economic consequences.

Sub-Saharan Africa has significant untapped hydropower potential, which is rarely mentioned. Hydropower is an important source of energy: it is clean and renewable. However, it often receives negative press due to its potential negative consequences. It is important to acknowledge that every source has some negative consequences. The key is to find solutions to mitigate drawbacks while maximising the benefits.

Hydropower is being promoted worldwide, with significant investments, especially in China. This country leads in energy investment across all fields, including nuclear, renewables, solar, wind, and hydropower. Large investments in hydropower have historically been made in Asia, Europe, North and South America. However, in Africa, investments remain minimal. Currently, less than 10% of Africa's potential is exploited. Numerous well-known projects have been on the table for decades, some for over a century. These projects are well-identified and could be pursued, but they are not being developed. Why? The primary issue is scale. The amount of electricity these projects could generate exceeds the size of the local market, making it challenging to establish a proper project financing scheme, and guarantee a cash flow that would justify the initial investment. Hence to make these projects possible, international cooperation is required.

A potential application of hydropower is the production of hydrogen. The European Union aims at progressively replacing its dependence on methane and natural gas with hydrogen, while also considering the possibility of using e-fuels for mobility. It is puzzling why hydrogen is deemed to be produced only with solar and wind power. Electrolysers work sub-optimally without a consistent electricity supply; relying on solar power, they will be able to operate even in the Sahara for at most 2.000 hours annually out of 8.760 hours that are in a year, resulting in high-cost hydrogen production. Instead, hydropower can allow electrolysers to operate for many more hours and diversify our hydrogen sources more effectively.

The rationale behind certain countries' plans to import hydrogen from Saudi Arabia, as if the current level of dependency were not enough, is unclear. Importing hydrogen from Morocco seems more understandable.

However, Africa's potential is much greater, albeit with the important challenge which is that hydrogen is difficult and expensive to transport. This underscores the strong interest in local utilisation and transformation of hydrogen. Sub-Saharan Africa will remain essential for metals crucial to our batteries and power infrastructure for the foreseeable future. There is potential not only to export raw ores but also to locally process and refine them leveraging hydrogen availability, transforming these countries' natural resources into semi-finished products for export. This represents a substantial economic and security opportunity, as relying on a limited number of hydrogen suppliers without market flexibility poses significant risks.

Giacomo Luciani teaches at the Paris School of International Affairs, Sciences Po (since 2010), and at the University of Geneva in the Master of Commodity Trading (since 2008). From 2008 to 2023 he also taught at the Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, and in 2010-13 he was Global Scholar at Princeton University.
He has launched a MOOC on Coursera entitled "Politics and Economics of International Energy" that has seen 71.000 students enrolled as of July 2024.
His latest edited publications include the *Handbook of International Energy Economies* (Palgrave Macmillan 2022), co-edited with Manfred Hafner, open access https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-86884-0 (published in May 2022, has been downloaded 1,4 million times as of July 2024).

Prime minister of Cabo Verde visits NATO. October 2023.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

RICHARD D. HOOKER
Senior fellow, Atlantic Council, Washington D.C.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

While much attention is directed towards the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the long-term stability and prosperity of Europe are also directly linked to that of the African continent. Surprisingly, significant work and investment have been undertaken in recent years in this regard. The European Union, due to its role in economic development and governance, is a leading institution in this effort. Additionally, some comments on NATO's role will be included.

A leading effort in this regard is the African-EU energy partnership, a long-term framework for strategic dialogue between the EU and the African continent. This partnership aims at sharing knowledge, set common political priorities, and develop joint programmes on key energy issues of interest to both Europe and Africa. It is one of the partnerships adopted under the joint Africa-EU strategy, signed by 80 African and European heads of State and government at the 2007 Lisbon Summit.[1] The overall objective of the partnership is to improve access to secure, affordable, and sustainable energy for both continents, with a special focus on increasing investments in energy infrastructure in Africa.

For example, a major project aims at laying the world's longest high voltage submarine cables, spanning 2.300 miles from giant energy farms in the Moroccan desert to southwest England. This project could provide up to 8% of the United Kingdom's electricity, with a cost set at 22 billion euros.[2] Another example is the submarine cable project now underway to carry 3.000 megawatts of power from Egypt to Greece, with a budget of 3,5 billion euros.[3] This project aims at replacing 4,5 billion cubic metres of fossil gas each year.

The commitment to the partnership was renewed by both the EU and the African

[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf.

[2] https://xlinks.co/morocco-uk-power-project/.

[3] https://www.euronews.com/2022/09/17/this-1373km-long-undersea-cable-will-bring-green-energy-from-egypt-to-europes-electricity-.

Union during the EU-AU Summit in Brussels in February of 2022.[4] An investment package of approximately 150 billion euros was announced to support the continents' common ambitions for the EU's agenda 2030 and the AU's agenda 2063. This investment package is part of the Commission's Global Gateway Strategy,[5] aimed at supporting investment in sustainable infrastructure worldwide. Through Global Gateway, the EU supports several flagship projects in Africa, including those in the energy sector. In the context of this sixth EU-AU Summit, the EU also proposed the new Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative[6] within the Global Gateway investment package. This initiative will support large-scale sustainable electrification programmes on the African continent, aiming at transforming prospects for African people and help the economy grow by addressing three priorities: increasing the number of African people, businesses, and industries having accesso to affordable, modern, and sustainable energy services; support investments in renewable energy generation; promote energy efficiency.

By 2030, the EU-Africa Green Energy Initiative intends to provide at least 100 million people with access to electricity. A total of 3,4 billion euros in the EU grants will be delivered through Team Europe[7] to support renewable energy, its efficiency, a just transition, and the greening of local value chains. Part of this funding will be used to leverage private sector investments via guarantees and blending under the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD).[8] The initiative also proposes to promote new opportunities for cooperation on clean hydrogen production in Africa through four modes of cooperation: research, regulation, investments and trade.

Another initiative is Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP)[9], a global collaboration aimed at assisting emerging economies in transitioning from fossil energy to clean energy while addressing social and economic challenges. A similar agreement was signed by the EU, along with the governments of France, Germany,

[4] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/meetings/international-summit/2022/02/17-18/.

[5] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway_en.

[6] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/africa-europe-green-energy_en.

[7] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/team-europe-initiatives_en#what-is-team-europe.

[8] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/european-fund-for-sustainable-development.html.

[9] https://dgap.org/en/research/glossary/climate-foreign-policy/just-energy-transition-partnerships#:~:text=Just%20Energy%20Transition%20Partnerships%20(JETPs,help%20it%20in%20this%20regard.

the United Kingdom and the USA, with South Africa in November of 2021.[10] Under this partnership, more than 3 billion euros will be provided to support South Africa's climate commitments. In Paris in June of 2023, France, Germany, the EU, the United Kingdom and Canada, signed a joint partnership mobilising an additional 2,5 billion euros. This initiative wants to accelerate the deployment of renewable energies and increase their share in Senegal's electricity capacity to 40% by 2030.[11]

One of the most effective ways to support the transition to sustainable, affordable and accessible energy in Europe and Africa is through promoting joint research and innovation efforts in renewable energy and energy efficiency. Accordingly, the European Commission, EU countries, and EU financial institutions also support the Electrification Financing Initiative (ElectriFi)[12]. This initiative contributes to the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI)[13], that was launched in Paris in 2015. Its goal is to harness Africa's abundant renewable energy resources to support their development strategies and accelerate the shift towards low-carbon economic development. The EU and South Africa have maintained a Strategic Partnership since 2006, which is broad, comprehensive, driven by mutual political, trade, and development interests, including sustainable climate and energy initiatives. Both sides collaborate on implementing the Paris agreement.

According to EU climate chief, Frans Timmermans, Africa is expected to become Europe's most important partner as Europe seeks to expands its renewable energy supply and transition to green hydrogen. In general, Europe in actively and constructively engaging with the AU, deploying major resources to develop an energy partnership that is paramount for all parties involved. Where does NATO fit into this? NATO has maintained a working relationship and official relationship with the AU since 2005. At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO leaders committed to increasing political and practical cooperation with the AU.[14] Simultaneously, Allies endorsed NATO's framework for the South, which aims to integrate and streamline NATO's approach to tackle challenges by focusing on enhanced capabilities, improved anticipation and response, and bolstered regional partnership and capacity building efforts.

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[10] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/IP_21_5768.

[11] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/%20en/ip_23_3448/IP_23_3448_EN.pdf.

[12] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/programming/projects/electrifi-electrification-financing-initiative_en.

[13] https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20151209-3.

[14] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.

In November of 2019, NATO and the AU signed an agreement to strengthen political and practical partnerships.[15] In March 2020, additional cooperation initiatives were approved by Allies to progressively advance the NATO-AU relationship from ad hoc support to more substantive practical partnership. NATO maintains a dedicated liaison element with the AU, providing technical expertise and training support in areas such as maritime, finance, monitoring, procurement, air movement coordination, communications, information technology, logistics, human resources, military manpower management, and contingency planning. NATO coordinates its efforts related to the AU with bilateral partners and other international organisations, including the EU and the UN.

NATO's activities naturally focus on security issues, and its relationship with the AU complements the EU's efforts. This contributes to stability on the African continent and supports the ongoing work in the energy sector. It is noteworthy that 23 NATO Allies are also EU members, with another 4 in candidate status. Many NATO military representatives also serve as EU military representatives, fostering coordinated efforts to strengthen this relationship. A partnership that is essential to everyone.

Europe's future is intertwined with the African continent, particularly in the energy sector. The Ukrainian conflict disrupted global energy markets, emphasising the potential role of African states in the shift towards renewable or green energy. This relationship will only gain importance as we navigate a challenging yet promising future. NATO's relationship with Africa is expected to grow, aimed at assisting African states in building the crucial security and stability needed for all. Europe is moving away from its dependence on Russian energy, and Africa offers exciting opportunities with access to innovative renewable energy sources, crucial for addressing climate change. This represents the future: for Africa, for Europe, and for the international community.

[15] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_170512.htm.

Dr **Richard D. Hooker** is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council, following service as The Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Affairs and Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington DC. A former Dean of the NATO Defense College, Dr Hooker is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Senior Research Associate with the Changing Character of War Program at the University of Oxford, and a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation. Dr Hooker also served on the National Security Council during the Clinton and Bush administrations, and as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the NSC from April 2017 to July 2018. A career Army officer, he served in combat in Grenada, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, including command of a parachute brigade in Baghdad from 2005 to 2006.

ENERGY STRATEGIES 2024.
AFRICA, NATO AND ENERGY SECURITY OF SUPPLY

Advanced Research Workshop organised by the NATO Defense College Foundation *in co-operation with the* NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, *the* Policy Center for the New South, *the* Fondazione Compagnia di San Paolo, *the* NATO Defense College *and* the Middle East Institute Switzerland.

Rome | Tuesday, 16th of April 2024
Venue: *Rome | Sala Visconti - Le Méridien Visconti Hotel (via Federico Cesi, 37)*

14,30 – 14,45 *Welcome Remarks*

- **Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo**, President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome
- **Max Nielsen**, Commandant, NATO Defense College, Rome
- **Stefano La Tella**, Counsellor, Office of the Diplomatic Advisor, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Rome

14,45 – 15,00 *Opening Remarks*

- **Nouzha Chekrouni**, Senior Fellow, Policy Center for the New South, Rabat

Session I
Africa: Mapping Energy Diversification

An energy portfolio diversification between European importers and regional producers is a

complex endeavour, also in the context of an ongoing war and, in the medium-term, the EU Green Deal. The newest exploitable resources are owned by at least a dozen countries across the African Continent, while additional six countries are among those with the biggest reserves. What are the opportunities and the risks? How to protect essential infrastructure? How to weave in renewables?

Chair: **Mehmet Öğütçü**, Chairman, London Energy Club, London
- **Giuseppe Mistretta**, Director for Sub-Saharan Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Rome
- **Ahmet Evin**, Founding Dean, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Professor Emeritus, Sabanci University, Instanbul
- **Massimo Amato**, Associate Professor, Bocconi University, Milan
- **Claudia Gazzini**, Senior Libya Analist, International Crisis Group, Tripoli

Q&A Session

16,00 – 16,30 *Coffee Break*

16,30 – 17,30

Session II
AU-NATO: Furthering a Pragmatic Collaboration

The cooperation between the African Union and the Atlantic Alliance is gradual and pragmatic. The new energy needs suggest a common reflection on energy security of supply in a continent characterised by both a high competition for primary resources and instability (Sahel, Horn of Africa, etc.). How to take into account geopolitical and geoeconomic variables in terms of energy security of supply? What are the best means and formats?

Chair: **Andrea Cellino**, Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute Switzerland, Geneva
- **Julian Wieczorkiewicz**, Policy Officer, Climate and Energy Security Section. Innovation, Hybrid and Cyber Division, NATO HQ, Brussels
- **Andrea Grazioso**, Senior Analyst, NATO Strategic Direction-South HUB, Naples
- **Johan van den Berg**, Head of Secretariat, Africa-EU Energy Partnership, Bonn
- **Abdellatif Aboualatta**, Permanent Observer, Permanent Delegation of the African Union to the United Nation, Geneva

Q&A Session

17,30 – 18,00 *Coffee Break*

Session III
The Challenge of Market Integration

Market integration in Africa has started at least in 2018 but, in order to ensure North-South and South-South exchanges, it also needs a cooperative security framework to achieve stability. How do market actors interact among themselves and with (inter)governmental bodies ensuring energy security? How to shape market regulation?

Chair: **Jessica Obeid**, Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Middle East Institute Switzerland, Geneva

- **Leonardo Bellodi**, Adjunct Professor, Luiss Business School, Rome
- **Afaf Zarkik**, Senior Economist, Policy Center for the New South, Rabat
- **Giacomo Luciani**, Scientific Advisor, SciencesPo, Paris

Q&A Session

19,00 – 19,15 *Concluding Remarks*

- **Richard D. Hooker**, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C.

Eco-friendly wind turbine station utilised for electricity generation at a wind farm in South Africa.