The European elections saw, in general, a confirmation of the previous major parties in the EU parliament, alongside a victory for conservatives in countries such as Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Despite being challenged by his new opponent, Peter Magyar, Viktor Orbán also managed to secure victory. Considering these results, do you expect any changes in the EU’s enlargement process and the EU’s attitude towards the Western Balkans, in particular during the Hungarian presidency of the EU?

The European Parliament is the most enlargement-friendly EU institution. This will not change despite the stronger performance of far-right parties. But it is the EU member states which primarily determine EU enlargement policy. I am therefore more concerned about expected strong gains for the far right in upcoming elections in France (results not yet in at the time of this interview) and Austria.

The problem for EU enlargement policy sits deeper, however. The enlargement process is stuck. It has lost most of its credibility over the last decade.

To reverse this trend and turn the accession process again into a reform engine which pushes countries to reform at an extraordinary scale and speed, we do not need the continuation of what we have been doing over the last years. We need change.

Meanwhile, the situation in the region appears to be getting more complicated, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Following the approval at UNGA of the ‘Srebrenica resolution,’ new threats emerged from Dodik, along with the ‘All-Serb meeting’ in Belgrade. Are you concerned about the stability of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Yes, I am concerned, and not only about Bosnia-Herzegovina. The key question is: What can outside actors do to help foster democracy and push reforms? Usually, it’s less than we think. But there is one exception: the EU accession process. The ten former communist countries that became EU members in the 2000s were all transformed dramatically through this process. This worked because the EU provided substantive assistance and a very attractive goal – EU membership. The EU said: If a country meets all the tremendously ambitious EU standards, it will be admitted to the EU.

This promise does not stand any more. The EU, pushed by its member states, made the process so cumbersome that practically no one believes any more that attaining membership is possible. This undermines reformers and strengthens strongmen like Mr Dodik. In today’s environment those who say “Let’s undertake these demanding EU reforms” appear naïve. The best way to weaken politicians like Mr Dodik and strengthen pro-European reformers is to provide again an attractive, credible goal that countries can reach by their own efforts.

What about Kosovo? The issue of the dinar remains unresolved, Serbs are still out from the local institutions, and Belgrade and Pristina are not seriously engaging in dialogue at the Brussels table. Can we expect any breakthroughs in the coming months? What steps should the new EU executive take to finally compel Belgrade to negotiate a normalisation agreement, and what kind of agreement should it be?

I cannot imagine a breakthrough anytime soon. Currently there is no reason for Serbia to recognise Kosovo or even to implement the most recent Agreement which would include “de-facto” recognition. Kosovo has nothing to offer Serbia that would make such a step attractive. Nor has the EU, except one thing: EU membership. But currently, this prospect is very far away. It remains unclear if Serbia would be allowed to join even if it fulfilled all requirements.

Too many member states still oppose further enlargement. There is only one way around this dilemma. The EU should be honest and announce: “Full membership remains the goal, but we cannot promise that when the candidate countries are ready, we in the EU will be ready for enlargement as well. But we promise that once a country will have met all the membership criteria, we will at least admit this country to the Single Market, with full access to the four freedoms and EU funds.” Such an approach could run in parallel to the formal accession process, without being subject to constant vetoes by member states. It would provide a very attractive goal that is urgently required to re-energise the process.

Additionally, North Macedonia has entered a new phase, with the new conservative leadership openly disregarding the Prespa Agreement. Can we anticipate a new front of tension between Skopje, Athens, and Sofia?

North Macedonia has become an EU candidate in 2005, nearly 19 years ago. It still has not opened a single negotiation chapter, because it was continuously blocked, first by Greece, then – after the Prespa Agreement – by France, and since then by Bulgaria. The reasons had nothing to do with EU standards. Even if North Macedonia fulfilled Bulgaria’s current demands, there is no guarantee that Bulgaria would not add additional demands afterwards.

To step back from the Prespa Agreement is of course not conductive to progress. But it also does not really change North Macedonia’s situation, as it is blocked anyway. If politicians see that the vision of a better and more prosperous future as an EU member state is falling apart, they will look for another political narrative. In the Western Balkans, the fall-back-option is nationalism, including territorial claims towards neighbours. We know where all this led to in the 1990s. We are in a dangerous situation, in particular with regard to Kosovo and Bosnia. It’s in the EU’s power and interest to offer a positive narrative that fosters peace and prosperity. It is needed more than ever.

Finally, more than 20 years have passed since the Thessaloniki summit, and the region remains distant from the EU, while even Ukraine and Moldova are advancing faster in the integration process. Are you concerned that keeping the Balkans as an isolated ‘island’ separate from the bloc could lead to the situation getting out of control, especially considering the fragile state of democracy in countries like Serbia?

I am very concerned. I fear that Ukraine and Moldova will soon wake up the realities of today’s accession process, a process in which even countries that pursue reforms cannot move fast enough to maintain the required energy, stamina and determination.

In the Balkans such disillusionment is already advanced. After the wars of the 1990s, the EU has managed to provide a vision for a stable and prosperous future for the Western Balkans for two decades. It thereby made a huge contribution turning a region haunted by war and suffering into a very peaceful and promising post-conflict region. All this risks to unravel now. The lack of a clear reaction by the EU after Serbian paramilitaries invaded Kosovo in September 2023, might sound to some like an encouragement to try again. Violence in the Balkans is more likely today than any time over the last 20 years.

European leaders talking about a geopolitical Europe should to start here, in the EU’s periphery, where the EU has all the means to make a crucial difference. It has done so earlier; it can do so again.