Sudan and Libya: the revolving doors

The destabilising consequences of the war between Israel and Palestine, including the swift return of the Palestinian cause to the agenda of Arab governments, have been particularly clear in the Near East. Less visible, but nonetheless equally impactful, are the reverberations of the Sudan civil war, ongoing since April 2023. The fight between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF, the regular army) is having important ramifications in the whole region, particularly in North Africa. The conflict has created a mass exodus of Sudanese civilians, who have fled to neighbouring countries, including Libya. For this reason, the visit of the SAF commander and chairman of Sudan’s Transitional Military Council Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Tripoli on the 26^th of February could not have come at a better time. While meeting the head of the Presidency Council Mohamed Menfi and the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity (GNU) Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, Burhan thanked Libyan authorities for supporting Sudanese refugees.

However, humanitarian concerns surely were not the only point on the agenda of the Tripoli meetings, since the interdependence between Libya and Sudan runs deep and involves non-State actors active on both sides of the border. That is certainly true for the RSF, whose fighters have been recruited as mercenaries to back the forces of Gen. Khalifa Haftar during the battle of Tripoli in 2019-2020; but also, for the Russian military intelligence (GRU), which, since the demise of Yevgeny Prigozhin, has established a firm grip on the activities of the now defunct Wagner Group. Under the leadership of Andrey Averyanov (a veteran of subversion and targeted neutralisations, within Unit 291215), the new Expeditionary Corps (unofficially known as Africa Corps) has now switched the flow of military support, bringing in Sudan fuel and weapons from Libya.

In times of geopolitical upheaval, the revolving doors along these porous borders are raising the concerns of Algeria, which, after starting to lose ground in the Sahel, is now making a huge diplomatic effort to stay relevant. In this context, it is worth reminding that before visiting Tripoli, at the end of January, Burhan was in Algiers, where he was greeted by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune. Considering the political proximity between Algiers and Tripoli, as well as their common dislike of Haftar, the prospect of a common front with the GNU and the SAF to face off common challenges in the region was certainly a distinct possibility for Algerian decision-makers.

Nevertheless, this emerging regional alignment puts Dbeibah in a tough spot. Already under pressure at home, where supporters of a new national unity government are getting more vocal, the GNU Prime Minister seems to be the one who stands to lose the most because of this diplomatic push. By meeting with Hemedti in Tripoli on the 29^th of February, Dbeibah has been eager to offer his good offices to both conflict parties in Sudan. At a closer look, however, he is now engaging in difficult balancing act to salvage his common understanding with Haftar, not antagonise influential foreign powers like the UAE (which has now a frosty relation with Algeria) and stay in power indefinitely.