Partners of choice

Diplomatic tensions between Algeria and Morocco in the Maghreb are driving an arms race that is constantly escalating, in line with geopolitical uncertainties and international arms transfers worldwide. Following the transfer of the firsts 24 AH-64E Apache helicopters from the USA to Rabat (part of a US$4.25 billion sale agreed in 2019), Algiers responded in kind, with reports in February suggesting the purchase of Sukhoi Su-57 Felon (an advanced stealth multi-role fighter) from Russia.

Rumours about the deal have been ongoing for quite some time: in 2020 Russian sources were already indicating negotiations for the purchase of 14 fifth-generation multirole fighter jets. Nevertheless, development problems (including a crash during a test flight in 2019 in the Khabarovsk Region) and delays due to the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that has severely constrained Moscow’s military exports, have significantly slowed down the process.

From a technical point of view, the purchase would provide Algeria with a fifth-generation aircraft that is expected to improve significantly the capabilities of the air force and modernise an ageing fleet (generally of third generation). Mainly consisting of Russian-sourced equipment, Algeria already owns MiG-29S/UB Fulcrum, Su-30MKA Flanker H and Su-24M/MK Fencer D, among others, but clearly lacks a stealth fighter jet, considered indispensable especially if Morocco would proceed with the acquisition of F-35s.

More interestingly, the deal confirms Russia as Algeria’s main supplier for its arms procurement needs and defies the high expectations raised with the recent deal signed late last month with the US AFRICOM. While the new MoU on Defence Cooperation still leaves some room to manoeuvre for reinforced military cooperation and a potential diversification of partnerships, the Su-57 deal would make the preference of the Algerian military very clear.

On the regional level, the impact would be less evident. It is very unlikely that the potential arms purchase of both Algiers and Rabat would lead to an escalation (as both sides have already shown in the past that there is no appetite for a military confrontation, particularly on Western Sahara), but the ongoing arms race could reinforce the diplomatic standoff, presenting less and less opportunities for dispute resolution.

Regardless of any potential miscalculation, Algeria’s position vis à vis Western partners remains peculiar, in line with its traditional non-alignment. While the change of administration in Washington has clearly produced a Rabat-leaning USA (whose Secretary of State Marco Rubio has already threatened sanctions against Algiers in the past as US congressman), the EU stands idle with no coherent policy on Algeria and a growing divide among its main members.

After its recognition of Morocco’s autonomy plan for the Western Sahara as the most credible basis for a resolution to the conflict, France has seen its relations with Algeria deteriorating, with both parts engaged in a war of words and reciprocal accusations. On the other hand, Italy has become the partner of choice for Algeria, a target country for its Piano Mattei for the development of the African continent.

The privileged partnership with Italy runs contrary to the common narrative describing Algeria as a strict ally of Russia, in spite of the long-standing arms procurement from Moscow. A theory further corroborated by Algeria’s rejection of foreign military presence (including the Russian Africa Corps), along its borders and neighbouring states that can still offer a viable opportunity to rally on a common feeling of a perceived threat of destabilisation.