The normalisation wave triggered by the Abraham Accords in 2020, when Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and the UAE established diplomatic ties with Israel, has suffered a considerable setback following the resumption of hostilities between Israel and Palestine. The attack carried out by Hamas in October 2023 and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)’s harsh retaliation on Gaza have upended the regional trend, resulting in widespread protests and increasing scrutiny of the uneasy relationship between Arab world and Tel Aviv.
This is particularly true for Morocco, where the Makhzen has been treading a very fine line since the start of the ongoing war. Facing popular anger over the humanitarian crisis caused by the ongoing offensive in Gaza, King Mohammed VI has so far not changed course over the resumption of diplomatic ties with Israel (suspended after the start of the Second Intifada in 2000), the consolidation of Rabat’s claims over the Western Sahara being the main reason.
Nevertheless, deepening military ties with Israel are causing a backlash, as shown by the negative reaction of the public opinion to the docking on 6-7 June of the INS Komemiyut. Built in the US shipyard of Pascagoula, the Israel’s navy new landing craft called in Tanger Med for supplies while en route to Haifa. News of the docking emerged only two weeks later, brought by the Front Marocaine de soutien à la Palestine et contre la normalisation.
Since the start of the conflict in Gaza, the NGO has been among the most vocal against the normalisation of ties with Israel. Despite its limited results, it has represented a thorn in the side of the authorities, which have only paid lip service to the Palestinian cause so far. The announcement of 40 tons of medical aid to Gaza, made by the Foreign Ministry on 24 June, was just a timely response to the Komemiyut case.
Notwithstanding public diplomacy moves, such as the support to the ceasefire proposal advanced by Washington and the humanitarian aid conceded to the Palestinians, there are no signs so far that Morocco (as well as the other signatories of the Abraham Accords) could reconsider its ties to Israel over the war in Gaza. While the policy is not set in stone, bilateral cooperation is likely to continue, especially in the military domain, particularly sensitive for its regional implications.
Indeed, amid the ongoing confrontation with Algeria that worsened immediately after Morocco’s inclusion in the normalisation front, Rabat seems destined to double down on its new partnerships and traditional allies. In this context, the US remains paramount, as shown by the 20th edition of the Africa Lion military exercises that just took place also in Morocco (as well as in Ghana, Senegal and Tunisia). Considering the great power competition, particularly acute in Africa, the interest is reciprocated.
Washington certainly sees Morocco as a fundamental partner for many reasons, including its geographic location. In a region where the US and the Western world are rapidly losing ground to strategic competitors, Rabat is seen as an anchor of stability that deserves special attention given the ongoing turmoil in the Sahel and uncertainties in North Africa, where the anti-normalisation front seems to have the upper hand anyway, both in the streets and in the corridors of power.
