After promising US$1,1bn last summer and lobbying the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a deal worth US$1,9bn to avoid a consequential economic collapse, EU partners are again worrying about Tunisia, a country on which rising powers have already set their sights on. The interest is reciprocated as President Kais Saïed has quickly learned how to hedge his bets in the new multipolar world introduced by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s war in Gaza following Hamas’ attack last October.
Despite a longstanding partnership with the US and the status of Major Non-NATO Ally, Tunisia has been busy reaching out to strategic competitors of the West, such as China, Iran and Russia. Before taking part in the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum with other regional leaders in Beijing at the end of May, Saïed also paid respect to President Ebrahim Raisi in Teheran after his death, in the first very visit of a Tunisian President to Iran after the Islamic Revolution.
However, considering Moscow’s expanding influence in Africa, it’s Tunisia’s ties with Russia that have come increasingly under scrutiny. This is where an article published by the Italian newspaper La Repubblica in mid-May comes into the picture. The piece said that Russian transport aircraft have been spotted at the Djerba airport, raising fears of a domino effect that after Libya and the Sahel could see Moscow gaining a military foothold in Tunisia as well.
A worrying scenario for the EU and Italy, which has reserved a special role for Tunisia in the so-called Piano Mattei, an investment plan that would reinforce energy ties with and stem migration from Africa. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has been busy selling the plan to her partners, including the US, whose State Department did not confirm the nature of the Russian activities in Djerba, only expressing concerns about the role of the Africa Corps (ex-Wagner Group) in fuelling conflicts and migration. Tunis did not comment on the news and Moscow dismissed the report as a fabrication and lies. Tunisian sources tell that since months Russian aircraft use the airport just to refuel and that a deployment of contractors would have been clearly spotted during the concurrent US-led manoeuvre African Lion 2024 (AL24, 19-31 May), taking place also in Tunisia.
The alarmist message that transpires from these reports is that the West cannot afford to lose Tunisia, in spite of its visible and most pressing domestic issue. Indeed, the Russian presence was reported on the backdrop of an unprecedented crackdown on dissent that has led to the arrests of activists, lawyers and journalists. Furthermore, the anti-migrant campaign launched last year by Saïed and fully backed by the EU is raising widespread concerns about the respect of rights of asylum-seekers, migrants and refugees.
The shrinking civic space has drawn the criticism of most Western partners, including the EU, France and the USA. On the other hand, Italy, which has established a privileged relation with Saïed during Meloni’s mandate, has so far remained silent over the growing repression for fear of jeopardising a migrant deal that is important for the governmental majority. Threading a very fine line, Rome has all interest in reminding allies and partners of the need to keep Tunisia close. Leveraging the Russian presence in North Africa (much more visible and consistent in Libya and Syria, see map) would very much serve this purpose.
That said, since March Maghreb specialists alerted with an NDCF paper about the importance of “swing countries” across the Southern Mediterranean, i.e. countries willing to consider less traditional alliances (see Ghazi Ben Ahmed and Andrea Cellino, Revitalizing EU’s Southern Regional Strategy, https://www.natofoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/NDCF-Paper-Ahmed-Cellino-Revitalizing-EUs-Southern-Regional-Strategy.pdf).
