The Red Sea chess game

The resumption of hostilities between Israel and Palestine caused by the Hamas attack last October has inflamed the Middle East, raising fears of a major confrontation between Iran and the US. While Lebanon (where Hezbollah and Tel Aviv are engaged in a tug-of-war that risks leading to a serious escalation) continues to be a peculiar case, the presence of American troops elsewhere in the region may be a liability that provides the so-called axis of resistance with easy targets to carry out their retaliation for the ongoing war in Gaza.

Iraq and Syria are certainly a case in point, as well as Jordan, where on 28^th of January a drone attack at the Tower 22 military base that killed three US soldiers and injured 47 others pushed the whole region much closer to escalation. Given the economic and security implication, the Red Sea represents another major chessboard. Here the Houthis, part of the network of proxies built by Teheran in the last tumultuous decade, have been able to disrupt global trade, using drones and anti-ship missiles to target vessels.

The substantially measured response of the US (and the EU, which is launching a new naval mission called Aspides to protect freedom of navigation) suggests that there is no appetite for a major confrontation with the Houthis. Retaliatory strikes by the US and the UK are not likely to deter the Iran-aligned armed group, which have already endured more than eight years of airstrikes by the Saudi-lead coalition. Furthermore, Riyadh is urging caution to preserve its dialogue with the Houthis in order to extricate itself from the Yemen civil war.

Indeed, on the one hand, Palestinian cause apart, the Houthis are underlining their political and strategic value, in anticipation of a reduced interest by Tehran, and on the other, bombardments and naval patrolling have the main objective of reducing insurance prices on the Bab el-Mandeb – Suez Canal route.

The Saudi strategy is another aspect of the tentative rapprochement with Teheran initiated with the normalisation deal announced in Beijing last year. As the new multipolar order increasingly shapes the Middle East and North Africa, China’s shadow looms large also in the Red Sea crisis, where Washington is surprisingly seeking Beijing’s help to control the damage and avoid any miscalculation. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and national security adviser Jake Sullivan asked Chinese officials to urge Teheran to rein in the Houthis and stop attacks against commercial ships.

Despite the common interests in reducing the excessive shipping costs due to re-routing, the promising collaboration between China and the US on the Red Sea has not taken off. Part of the reason is that most of the Iranian-proxies, including the Houthis, respond much more to domestic agendas than to instructions from Teheran, whose command and control capacity over its affiliates is often exaggerated. Another reason must be found in the geopolitical reverberations of the Red Sea great-power competition, that is apparently seeing China far ahead over its main competitors, while in the USA there are political groupings advocating for a victorious war with Beijing.

Indeed, while the US has been dragged down in yet another Middle East crisis that would likely slow its pivot to Asia, India is having a hard time too. The war in Gaza and its regional ramifications are indeed raising serious doubts about the viability of the India-Middle East Economic Corridor. Announced at the G20 in New Delhi and devised to challenge the Belt and Road Initiative, this intermodal transport system also relied on the normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the main collateral damage of the ongoing conflict, together with Haifa in range of Hezbollah and Hamas missiles in future.