Iraq: maximum pressure, reversed

The ramifications of the war between Israel and Palestine have extended well beyond the Gaza Strip, ravaged by the airstrikes and the ground offensive carried out by Tsahal in response to the attack launched by Hamas on 7^th October. The whole region seem now in turmoil as the normalisation process between Israel and its Arab neighbours is inevitably frozen for the time being and the Middle East seems reverting to its previous cleavages. The conflict has also shone a spotlight on a reinvigorated axis of resistance, around which several armed groups and militias act as a proxy for the revisionist agenda of an Iran firmly at the helm of the anti-normalisation front.

Among the more active groups featuring prominently in the turbulent regional landscape, the Houthis are certainly a case in point. Alongside drone and missile attacks towards Israel launched by Yemen, the Zaidi group in control of the capital Sana’a has also highlighted a high degree of sophistication during the seizure of the Galaxy Leader cargo vessel in the Red Sea on 20^th of November. The attack, which targeted a ship associated to Abraham Ungar (an Israeli billionaire), also mirrored the tactics used by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in previous incidents targeting commercial vessels in the area, despite Teheran denying any responsibility in this specific case.

Responding more to the specific domestic agendas than to an elaborated regional strategy, the attacks of Iranian proxies against US interests in Iraq are producing far more reaching consequences for the delicate balance of power in a tense domestic environment gearing up for the provincial elections in December.

Iranian-affiliated groups part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (an umbrella group of Shia militias that follows in the footsteps of the Popular Mobilisation Forces) have claimed multiple strikes against US targets, including the Ain al-Asad airbase and the Harir airport in Erbil, according to a strategy of maximum pressure that mirrors, in reverse, the policy adopted by the Trump administration against Teheran.

The retaliation of the US troops, which have struck the Shia paramilitary group Kataeb Hezbollah killing nine members of the group and injuring five others on 21^st November, highlights all the risks of a dangerous tit for tat. As the government in Baghdad struggles to prevent any escalation between Iran and the US on Iraqi soli, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani already walks on a thin line at home. Ruled by the Federal Supreme Court for forgery, the dismissal of the powerful speaker of the parliament Mohammed al-Halbousi is producing shockwaves in the Iraqi domestic policy, pushing three ministers of his Takadum Party to resign in protest and confirming the overwhelming influence of the Iranian-backed Coordination Framework coalition over the executive.

Despite Sudani’s rejection of the Sunni ministers’ resignation, the episode highlighted once again all the limitations of the sectarian quota system known as ‘muhasasa al-ta’ifa governing institutional relations in Iraq since the end of US occupation. A system prone to crack and collapse under the immense pressure of the ongoing regional confrontation in which all actors involved are well aware of the risks of miscalculation and escalation.