The tit-for-tat entangling Iran and Israel in an escalatory spiral of violence in the Middle East has not only overshadowed the plight of Palestinian people, already enduring eight months of war in Gaza that have pushed the wider population to the brink of famine. Fears of an open confrontation between Tel Aviv and Teheran has also obfuscated other significant developments in the regional geopolitics, irremediably shaken by Hamas’ attack and its immediate aftermath. The visit to Baghdad of Recep Tayyip Erdogan is certainly a case in point, not only because it was the first presence of a Turkish President in Iraq in almost 13 years.
Meeting with Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid and Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, Erdogan signed 26 memorandums of understanding (MoU) on different issues, including energy, defence, trade, water, security cooperation, military training, and agriculture. The breadth of the sectors covered is not only a testimony to the extensive interests of Türkiye in deepening bilateral cooperation with an important neighbour but has also an interesting multilateral dimension as well. Indeed, the visit was also the occasion to sign a landmark agreement on the Iraq Development Road (IDR), an ambitious project that aims at connecting Asia with Europe via a network of ports, railways, and roads.
The involvement of Qatar and the UAE, whose Ministers of Transport were present in Baghdad and signed the deal as well, sheds light on the interest of Gulf states in being part of this promising economic corridor worth approximately US$17 billion. The 1200 km long project will connect the Iraqi port of Faw with Türkiye, further extending to Europe, providing an alternative option to the Suez Canal, whose traffic volume has been significantly affected by the ongoing war in Gaza. The rise of the Iranian-backed axis of resistance has indeed disrupted international shipping in the Red Sea, where the Houthis have multiplied their attacks.
Despite the international response, which resulted in several naval missions to mitigate the threat from Yemen, traffic has been nonetheless diverted, while competing projects to ensure the smooth flow of goods along the supply chains between Asia and Europe are also facing difficulties. It is the case of the US-backed India-Middle East-Europe (IMEC) economic corridor, whose MoU was signed at the last G20 summit in New Delhi. The precondition of the diplomatic normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia (both parts of the planned route) leaves this megaproject hanging in the balance, at least until the end of the hostilities in the Gaza Strip.
Not being part of IMEC, Qatar and Türkiye are all interested in supporting a rival project that would inevitably reinforce their strategic partnership in opposition to the normalisation front. By backing IMEC and the IDR the UAE opportunistically plays both sides, leaving the door open to distance itself even more from Saudi Arabia, seen as a competitor and partner at the same time. On the other hand, being at the very heart of the IDR, Iraq stands to reap most of the benefits of the new economic corridor, provided that it addresses the many issues still casting a shadow over the viability of the project. Iran, in a different political setting, could also benefit from a diversified logistics line.
