Certain shards, uncertain reconciliations

The unexpected fall of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria has sent new shockwaves in the Middle East and North Africa, a region still reeling from the fallout of the war in Gaza and fears of a major confrontation between Israel and Iran. The collapse of the Syrian regime, which has endured 13 years of grinding civil war that has destabilised the whole Levant, followed a lightning offensive by rebel groups. Led by Ha’ayt Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former al-Qaeda offshoot that has claimed to have severed ties with the jihadist group, the rebels reached Damascus on 8 December, establishing a transitional government and forcing Assad to flee to Moscow.

Despite bold claims and threats, neither Iran, nor Russia could intervene in Assad’s favour, helping to overturn his fortunes once again. Compared to the 2015 intervention, Moscow’s passivity is striking but preventable, finding an easy explanation in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine that clearly absorbs much more attention and resources than the latest Syrian developments. Seen from Tehran however, the fall of Assad represents a further blow to its regional ambitions, a sign of an influence that has been receding dramatically since the war in Gaza and the ensuing escalation between Iran and Israel, whose missile exchanges and attacks have raised fears of a widening regional war in 2024.

Severely diminished by Israel’s reaction to the 7^th of October 2023 attacks, Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon have both been decapitated. Their new leaderships are now struggling to retake the reins of both organisations, operating under severe constraints and difficulties. Despite their distance from both conflict theatres, the Houthis have also been targeted several times by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in retaliation for missile attacks from Yemen, while Iranian-affiliated militias in Iraq have limited their activities for fear of US’ reprisals. Eased by the weakening of Hezbollah, the surprising fall of Assad completes the image of an axis of resistance broken under immense Israeli pressure.

While questions still linger on about the resilience of Iranian proxies, the return of Donald Trump to the White House after the US elections presents a stark dilemma for policymakers in Tehran. A resumption of the maximum pressure campaign seems very likely, pushing Iran down the nuclear path, clearly perceived as the only chance for the survival of the regime. It is not a coincidence then that at the same time when rebels were reaching Damascus, uranium enrichment in Iran was already accelerating towards 60% purity (approaching the 90% level for weapons grade), according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose director general Rafael Grossi expressed serious concerns.

Regional rapprochement represents a viable alternative and the visit of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Egypt for the Developing 8 Organisation for Economic Cooperation (also known as D-8) on 19 December sets an interesting precedent. However, it is not yet clear how far the regional détente between former foes (some still affected by Iran’s proxy activities) will go in a changing landscape. As regional heavyweight (including Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but especially Turkey, expected to benefit the most from its closeness with HTS) rush to fill the void left by Moscow and Tehran in Syria, new fault lines are expected to show up, undermining any reconciliation attempt.