The disruption to maritime trafficking caused by the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea is having significant repercussions on the global shipping and telecommunications line as well. After several warnings by the Presidential Leadership Council (the internationally recognised government of Yemen exiled in Riyadh) about the intentions of the movement officially known as Ansar Allah (Followers of Allah), three data cables under the Red Sea were cut in late February. The responsibility of the rebel group, that seized vast swathes of the country since the start of the civil war, has not been proven yet, the same Houthis denied targeting the cables, and a specialised firm, DE-CIX, concluded that the anchor of the ship Rubymar (hit and sunk by a Houthi missile) caused accidentally the damage. That said it is clear how the protection of critical seabed infrastructure represents a crucial aspect of the battle still ongoing in these contested waters.
The sabotage of internet and data cables represented a significant escalation in the Red Sea crisis, which have so far resulted in the unrelenting missile strikes and drone attacks against international shipping off the coasts of Yemen. The Houthis have certainly not been deterred neither by the diplomatic pressure applied by their foes nor by their most close allies, including Iran. The extent of their autonomy begs questions about the proxy label associated with the group, part of the so-called axis of resistance revived by Teheran after the resumption of the conflict between Israel and Palestine later last year. In response to Tel Aviv’s military campaign in Gaza, the Houthis have targeted ships in the Red Sea linked to Israel, the UK and the USA.
Safe passage was instead assured to ships from China and Russia, following an understanding reached during a meeting in Muscat, Oman, between their diplomats and Mohammed Abdul Salam, spokesperson for the Houthis. In return, both Beijing and Moscow may provide diplomatic support to the rebel group during the discussions at the UN Security Council, exercising their veto power. Behind this transactional arrangement, the extending clout of China and Russia in this critical part of the world lays bare, especially after the recent joint Chinese, Iranian and Russian naval drill in the Gulf of Oman. Codenamed Maritime Security Belt 2024, the major exercise involved 20 vessels, including the three Chinese ships (guided missile destroyer Urumqi, one frigate and one tanker) and two Russian units (cruiser Varyag and one destroyer), plus fiver Iranian ships (three frigates, two stealthy corvettes). Observers from Azerbaijan, India, Kazakhstan, Oman, Pakistan and South Africa were invited for the first time. The exercise focussed on anti-piracy, search and rescue from a ship on fire, live firing at sea targets, night air defence shooting, and the simulated armed rescue of a hijacked merchant vessel.
The visible alignment between Beijing, Moscow and Teheran (which operates the intelligence gathering ship Behshad on vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb strait; and has reportedly asked Sudan for a naval base, without success) in this corner of the Indo-Pacific bears the risk of miscalculation and misidentification, as shown by the Chinese and Russian ships targeted recently. However, it is also in line with the strategic competition shaping the future international order.
Seen from this perspective, the Operation Aspides launched by the European Union (EU); the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian and the direct targeting of Houthis onshore by the US and the UK in Operation Poseidon Archer are just part of the multipolar struggle going on in the open water of the Red Sea.
