Recent disclosures of classified Russian military documents reveal attack plans against Japan and South Korea, highlight the increasingly interconnected nature of global security. These plans, originating between 2008 and 2014, identify 160 strategic targets, including military installations and critical civilian infrastructure such as nuclear power plants and transportation networks. The publication of these documents, after the arrival of North Korean troops in Ukraine, underscores the strategic linkages between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres.
One should, nevertheless, add that these contingency plans are the usual production of every well organised military general staff, especially those of major powers. They are more often than not a training and preparation “just in case”, because militaries since centuries do not believe and/or rely on “just-in-time” and they know that the best plan does not survive to the first contact with enemy forces. Moreover, if that crisis arises, it is better to have a starting point from which incrementally build up a more detailed planning than starting from scratch, especially if time becomes suddenly short.
On the other hand, planning can be initiated by the input of the political decision-maker and in this case the document acquires for a certain period of time a higher intelligence relevance. In any case Russia regularly carried out rotational (every four years) great exercises between the western (Zapad), southern (Kavkaz), central (Tsentr) and eastern (Vostok) military districts; experience has shown that not always drills are indicative of political or strategic intentions.
President’s Joe Biden strategic logic and directives have focussed in 2024 on deterring multiple nuclear adversaries (top classified Nuclear Employment Guidance, March 2024; declassified version to Congress in November) to be faced in simultaneous or sequential crises (DPRK, PRC and Russia) and on countering several adversaries that might coordinate their efforts (National Security Memo, December 2024). These adversaries are unofficially called the “axis of upheaval”, the “quartet of chaos” or, with another acronym “CRINK” axis (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea). Evidently a global power has global prudence, but sometimes the “Beltway” consultants love to lump together adversaries in order to rationalise and simplify what is neither rational nor simple. Even Biden administration officials understand that axis is an overblown word for a much looser coordination and probably quartet of chaos indicates better their internal problems and their external effect.
That said, Russia has a Pacific maritime façade since tzarist times and has a major ally in Asia-Pacific. The increasing coordination is shown by Russia and China intensifying joint military exercises across key strategic regions, including the East China Sea, the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, but also the Gulf of Oman and the skies over Alaska. Meanwhile, Japan and South Korea (both key counterparts of China) have increasingly shown interest for NATO, participating in joint exercises and strategic dialogues to enhance collective defence.
The war in Ukraine has added further connections Russia, China, Iran and North Korea: China and Iran offer economic, diplomatic and military support to Russia, while North Korea has provided munitions, thus amplifying NATO’s concerns. In fact, as soon as the presence of North Korean troops was confirmed in the Kursk province, NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, declared: “The deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea is a threat to both the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security” (28/10/2024), an ominous consequence of a dangerous Russian decision.
The recently declassified Russian military documents also reveal that Moscow has repeatedly tested air defences in Japan and South Korea, mirroring its provocative tactics against NATO in Europe. Additionally, in July 2024, China and Russia deployed nuclear-capable strategic bombers into the Alaska Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). It was the eighth joint bomber flight since 2019. The previous bomber flights were conducted in the Sea of Japan, East China Sea and Western Pacific, with some flying through the ADIZ of Japan and South Korea.
While the wider strategic debate talks about the CRINK, from NATO’s perspective these developments validate and strengthen the 306° security approach. The Alliance’s 2022 Strategic Concept recognized the growing risks posed by China’s assertive policies and the Washington Summit (July 2024) strengthened partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, while giving new impulse to Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partnerships in its new Southern Neighbourhood policy. NATO with the new administration will keep the necessary consensus to use all the appropriate tools in the region, starting from cooperative security, in order to build up the capabilities of regional partners while contributing to stifle or prevent dangerous escalations.
Alessandro Politi
A global political and strategic analyst with 30 years of experience. Director of the NATO Defense College Foundation since 2012.
Emanuele Rossi
He is an author and is specialised in international affairs and geopolitics with a focus on transatlantic relations, USA, China, Middle East.
