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Kazakhstan and nuclear energy option
Central Asia
Following the result of the referendum held on October 6, more than 70% of the voters expressed their support for the proposal to build a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan. This decision apparently paves the way for a radical shift in the national energy strategy, traditionally based on hydrocarbons, even if includes a rising attention on the renewable energy production aimed at exploiting the existing huge solar and wind potential. According to the Kazakh authorities, also nuclear energy could contribute to achieve the purpose to reduce the reliance on fossil fuels and to produce “clean” electricity in order to make greener the national energy mix as well as to achieve the climate ambitious targets and to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
At present about 80% of electricity in Kazakhstan is produced by burning coal, and nearly 15% is generated from renewable energy (solar and wind) and hydropower (A. Nakispekova, Kazakhstan to allocate over $110 million investments in renewable energy in 2024, Astana Times, 26 February 2024).
According to the Strategy Kazakhstan-2050 and the Concept for the Transition of the Republic of Kazakhstan to Green Economy – respectively launched in 2012 and 2013 by the former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev – the country aims at diversifying its energy mix, achieving an ambitious target for the power sector, namely 50% share of alternative and renewable energy by 2050, including 1,5 GWe of nuclear capacity by 2030 and 2,0 GWe by 2050 (World Nuclear Association, Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan, October 25, 2024). However, only in the last years President Tokayev has decided to concretely consider the realisation of a nuclear power plant: in addition to the referendum, the government announced an action plan that includes a 5% nuclear share of the national generation mix by 2025. The ambitious idea is to progressively phase out the polluting coal plants and to replace them with energy produced by a large nuclear reactor or small modular reactors.
In order to start a nuclear energy production as a net-zero carbon option to satisfy the growing needs of the national economy, Kazakhstan can benefit of a strategic advantage – holding 12% of the world’s uranium resources.
This allows the country to control one key dimension in the whole supply chain: in 2022 Kazakhstan produced 43% of the world’s uranium so this country could use an endogenous resource to enhance its energy security as well as diversifying the national energy mix without depending on imports (World Nuclear Association, Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan, October 25, 2024).
If uranium supply to support nuclear energy production is not a concern, the choice of the country from which to buy the reactors arises geopolitical considerations as well poses strategic challenges to deal with: at present, Kazakhstan has identified four potential contractors (Russia, South Korea, France and China) in a shortlist, all of these countries depend on Kazakh uranium (Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Future Depends on More Than a Referendum, Carnegie Politika, October 7, 2024).
Considering that Kazakhstan is member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union and to preserve regional strategic balance, the Russian state-controlled firm Rosatom seems the most logical choice, also because Rosatom is one of the world leaders concerning exports of nuclear technology: moreover, Rosatom is already engaged to support Uzbekistan in the realisation of a nuclear power plant, consisting in two reactors.
Besides the regional partners, France has become a promising partner to develop nuclear energy production, on the basis of a convergence of strategic interests: following the visit of French President Macron in Kazakhstan in November 2023, Kazakhstan will increase its uranium exports to France aimed at replacing the traditional source of this raw material from Niger, after the military golpe. On the other side, Kazakhstan is interested on attracting French investments, know-how and expertise to develop a domestic nuclear power industry (I. Vock, Why France’s Emmanuel Macron is courting Central Asia, BBC News, November 1, 2023)
Even if the construction of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan will take years, the renewed cooperation with France and the EU to further develop nuclear energy option could be strongly implemented, also thanks to the interesting developments in the East-West connectivity projects: as a matter of fact, since 2018 the Middle Corridor has become the main route of uranium supply from Kazakhstan to the EU, crossing the Caspian Sea to Baku port and then delivered through the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway before reaching the Turkish Mediterranean coast.
The strategic relevance of this route has been further enhanced after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the following unreliability of the trade corridors crossing Russian territory, affected by Western sanctions: at present, 64 percent of total uranium exports from Kazakhstan to the Western countries are delivered through the Middle Corridor (Kazakhstan boosts transportation of uranium products along Middle Corridor, Trend News Agency, February 5, 2024).
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Fabio Indeo
PhD in Geopolitics. He is non-resident researcher at the Center for Energy Governance and Security (EGS South Korea) and analyst at the Observatory for Central Asia and Caspian. He is research fellow at the University of Siena.
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