War in Sudan: it’s refugee crisis in Chad

On April 15, 2023, fighting erupted in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), quickly spreading across the country. The RSF, formed from the Janjaweed militias of the Darfur conflict in 2003, has grown into a powerful force under Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, or ‘Hemedti’.

In 2019, Hemedti and SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan ousted President Omar al-Bashir. However, after two years of transitional governance, they staged a military coup, ending hopes for democracy. Since April 2023, the SAF and RSF have engaged in intense civil warfare, targeting each other’s bases in Khartoum and vying for control of critical sites such as the presidential palace, airports and TV stations.

West Darfur, long affected by civil war, has seen the worst violence in this conflict. RSF forces and allied Arab militias have launched large-scale assaults on non-Arab communities, particularly the ethnic Massalit, killing thousands and displacing hundreds of thousands. Many fled across the border to Chad, escaping both fighting and atrocities that violate international law.

By late 2023, over 1 million Sudanese refugees had crossed into eastern Chad, most settling in the semi-arid Ouaddaï province. Refugees, primarily from West Darfur, live in overcrowded camps with limited access to food, water, and healthcare. Resources are strained, and tensions with impoverished local communities, who view refugees as competitors for resources, risk escalating into violence. Chadian youth, facing a lack of opportunities, are joining armed groups, while refugees, accused of monopolising aid, face attacks.

The Chadian government’s position is complicated: while seeking to secure its borders from the conflict’s spillover, it has allegedly facilitated arms transfers from the UAE to the RSF. In addition, UAE backs the RSF with funding, driven by its interests in Sudan’s gold trade and Red Sea ports. Others international actors have also played significant roles in Sudan’s conflict. Russia (first through the Wagner Group, then through the Afrikanski Korpus, at least since December 2023), trades arms for Sudanese gold, aligning with its goal of expanding influence in Africa. Egypt supports the SAF, seeing it as key to stability and to counter Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam project. However, Cairo fears the conflict’s spillover, which would add to existing crises on its borders (Gaza and Libya). Saudi Arabia has attempted to mediate, hosting peace talks in Jeddah in May 2023, though these efforts have not succeeded.

In 18 months of war, nearly 3 million Sudanese people have fled the country, with over 1 million seeking refuge in Chad. Ouaddaï province, hosting over 70% of these refugees, faces extreme strain. If the conflict continues, refugee flows into Chad and neighbouring countries will persist, and many Sudanese may cross the Sahara seeking safety in Europe, worsening tension over European migration policies.

Chad has the possibility to leverage its position as a key Sahelian country with European ties to secure aid and resources to address this crisis effectively. If uncontained, this conflict could spark a full-scale regional war. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, all with vested interests in the region, should logically prioritize efforts to maintain stability. This includes combating the illegal arms trade, which poses a significant threat as weapons risk falling into the hands of violent extremists. Of particular concern is the expanding influence of Russia’s paramilitary Wagner Group. In February, Wagner was reported to have recruited Chadian rebels and established a training camp for 300 fighters in the Central African Republic, Chad’s volatile neighbour.

Nevertheless, the recent US political elections and the complex situation within European governments and the EC, indicate that, for the time being, the region could not be the primary policy focus at Euro-Atlantic level.