The new Mecca of neutralism

The return of Mr Trump to the US Presidency has raised high expectations of reinforced ties between Washington and Gulf partners, which already had a shared perspective on the divisive geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa during the US President’s first term (2017-2020). Considering that Donald Trump’s first official visit at that time was in Riyadh and bearing in mind the very good relations the President’s former adviser Jared Kushner with the monarchy, Saudi Arabia is expected to benefit the most from the new Republican administration.

The kingdom has already been indicated as a possible venue for a summit between Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, over the future of Ukraine after preliminary talks held in February, between the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Riyadh has kept a neutral position, maintaining close coordination with Moscow in the OPEC+ cartel, while gaining significant leverage over the Democratic administration of former President Joe Biden. Regional peers like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have adopted the same foreign policy course.

The non-alignment has helped Saudi Arabia steer away from global polarisation, bestowing Riyadh with a renewed centrality used to demand extra concessions from foreign partners in return. This strategy has been employed on multiple times, most recently during the war in Gaza: despite significant pressure from Washington to join the Abraham Accords and normalise relations with Israel, the kingdom has not yielded, demanding in return the establishment of  Palestinian statehood, as well as security guarantees and assistance to develop uranium-enrichment capabilities and face off a nuclear Iran in the near future.

A multipolar world offers numerous opportunities, including in the sensitive defence industry sector, where Riyadh is carrying out an ambitious modernisation program that calls into question its traditional over-reliance on US arms imports. The opening made by the Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whilst in visit to al-Ula, about Saudi Arabia joining the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) multinational project (Italy, Japan, UK) shows an interesting possible deal between capital against technological transfers.

Indeed, in its 2025 budget, the kingdom has further increased its defence spending to $78 billion, approximately 7,1% of its GDP and 21% of the total government expenditures. The huge sums spent make Saudi Arabia an important client of Western arms exporters, which, according to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), was the fourth world arms importer in the 2020-2024 period.

Nevertheless, a significant shift is imminent on the horizon; following the rapprochement with former regional foes. In particular, Türkiye has set its sights on the opportunities offered by the promising Saudi market. After an agreement in 2023 to acquire unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), Ankara and Riyadh are negotiating a $6 billion defence deal that would include a partnership in the development of Kaan, a fifth-generation fighter jet developed by the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and British Aerospace (BAE) Systems, a potential challenger of the more costly and time-demanding GCAP (estimated production year 2035).