How would you rate the risks related to Russian influence in the Balkans, particularly in Serbia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Is Moscow a genuine threat for the region, also in the light of the war in Ukraine? 

In the context of the war in Ukraine, Russia has come to represents the most significant threat to peace and stability in Europe. This threat is particularly serious in the Western Balkans where Russia has systematically exploited ethno-political tensions in order to disrupt the regions’ Euro-Atlantic path and to challenge NATO and EU enlargement. At the same time, it painstakingly seeks to amplify its influence by undermining democratic institutions, installing massive disinformation and propaganda megaphones (like Sputnik, Russia Beyond and Russia Today media platforms operating in the Serbian language) and supporting authoritarian leaders. Active Kremlin supporters and collaborators are known to operate within the political systems of at least three countries in the region. These actors often mix their dangerous brand of ultra-nationalist populism with open support for Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Judging from the above the risk of disruptive Russian influence and interference in the region is significant.

In the previous months, Albania, but also Montenegro, North Macedonia, and, to a lesser extent, Bosnia, experienced significant cyberattacks, the most disruptive of which came from Teheran against Tirana. Do you believe the Balkans’ cyber-defences are up to par? If not, what are the dangers and what should be done? 

The recent string of attacks exposed significant cyber defence vulnerabilities that must be addressed with priority across the region. The disruptive attacks by Iranian-state sponsored actors against Albania’s critical information infrastructure are of particular concern not only because of the level of interference, penetration and damage caused to governmental services but also because of the coercive nature of the attack against the government of Albania, a NATO member, and by implications for NATO itself. In line with the New Strategic Concept of NATO 2022, Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia should improve their cyber defence infrastructure, networks, and capabilities in order to respond more effectively to malicious hybrid and cyber operations that are likely to increase in number and scope.  

You are a leading expert on the phenomenon of ‘foreign fighters’ joining ISIS, some of whom are from the region. Is the problem truly a thing of the past? What are the current major risks/sources of radicalization in the Balkans?

Even though ISIS has been defeated on the battlefield and is significantly depleted as an organization compared to 2014, it would be short-sighted to archive the problem of jihadist extremism in the Western Balkans and Europe in general. Clearly, the number of transnational threats that demand the attention of modestly resourced law enforcement agencies in the Balkans is high and that is a significant challenge. Yet, lowering the guard on the problem of jihadist foreign fighters would be a costly mistake. Jihadist extremism cannot be considered yesterday’s problem as long as the adverse socio-political conditions and the ideologically committed networks that facilitated the radicalization and mobilization of an unprecedented number of Western Balkans foreign terrorist fighters continue to exist and operate.

Is the Balkans a model that can be exported in terms of repatriation of foreign fighters and their families and reintegration into society? If so, could you please elaborate?

Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Bosnia have so far repatriated 217 nationals from Syria, including 31 men. They are the only European countries to have voluntarily and publicly repatriated ISIS-affiliated male fighters detained by Kurdish-led forces in Syria. The proactive repatriation of their nationals from prisons and IDP camps demands both praise and greater attention. Praise because the repatriation reduces the risk of their contribution to a potential ISIS re-emergence in Syria and Iraq. It also allows for a more effective management of security risks in the long run and provides an opportunity for the returnees’ rehabilitation and reintegration. Greater attention is, however, needed because the Western Balkans have become the region with the highest concentration of returning foreign terrorist fighters and their family members in Europe.

While most of the repatriated foreign fighters have been convicted on terrorism charges and sent to prison, their sentences have been significantly lower than the average prison term in the EU for jihadist terrorism-related offenses. Most of them are set to be released between 2023 and 2025. In preparation for their re-entry into society the authorities would do well to reassess and adjust sentencing ranges and conditional release practices. They should also consider implementing additional prison-based and post-incarceration risk assessment and management tools.

One persistent challenge to keep in mind is that the countries of the region are less than adequately resourced to handle a challenge of this dimensions with significant security implication for the region and Europe in general. The economic shocks resulting from the COVID pandemic and the war in Ukraine have further strained these resources and that is why the continued support (technical and financial) of international partners is very important.

Finally, in terms of security, what are the key issues in the region to be aware of in 2023?

A regional threat environment assessment would certainly include but would not be limited to threats such as: illegal drugs production, trafficking, and distribution; terrorism and political violence; illegal firearms and explosives smuggling; cybercrime and cyberterrorism; money laundering; and irregular migration, human smuggling and trafficking. These converging transnational threats are not particularly unique to the Western Balkans, but they become more challenging to handle in a region with continued flareups of inter-ethnic tensions against the backdrop of the general socio-political and economic instability caused in Europe by the Russian aggression in Ukraine.

What about the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue? Any hope for a permanent solution for the most destabilizing issue in the area?

Judging from the current state of play and the deep distrust between the parties, the prospects of a Kosovo-Serbia normalization agreement are not particularly promising. The latest Franco-German proposal for a new dialogue framework presents a positive development. Yet, as long as the urgency of normalization is more apparent to the international actors facilitating and supporting the dialogue than to the elected politicians in Pristina and Belgrade, it would be hard to reach a final agreement.

Ultimately what needs to change is the mindset of parties engaged in the dialogue. I don’t think that they share a common view on what the dialogue is about. And what is really needed is some fundamental kind of thinking about what the process is supposed to achieve. Clearly both sides believe they are righteous, so the dialogue it is not about something practical, tangible, it’s even not about pure interest. The parties are making it about something almost spiritual or moral, about historical rights, something that needs to be proven not negotiated through concessions. Frankly, until the current leaders of both Kosovo and Serbia can set that aside and look to the future, I’m not sure they are going to make any lasting progress.